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Chapter 5
Executive Summary
Chapter 5 analyzes the anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
trends until the present and the main drivers that explain those trends. 
The chapter uses different perspectives to analyze past GHG-emissions 
trends, including aggregate emissions flows and per capita emissions, 
cumulative emissions, sectoral emissions, and territory-based vs. con-
sumption-based emissions. In all cases, global and regional trends are 
analyzed. Where appropriate, the emission trends are contextualized 
with long-term historic developments in GHG emissions extending 
back to 1750.
GHG-emissions trends
Anthropogenic GHG emissions have increased from 27 (± 3�2) 
to 49 (± 4�5) GtCO2eq / yr (+80 %) between 1970 and 2010; GHG 
emissions during the last decade of this period were the high-
est in human history (high confidence).1 GHG emissions grew on 
average by 1 GtCO2eq (2.2 %) per year between 2000 and 2010, com-
pared to 0.4 GtCO2eq (1.3 %) per year between 1970 and 2000. [Sec-
tion 5.2.1]
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial pro-
cesses contributed about 78 % of the total GHG emission increase 
from 1970 to 2010, with similar percentage contribution for the 
period 2000 – 2010 (high confidence). Fossil fuel-related CO2 emis-
sions for energy purposes increased consistently over the last 40 years 
reaching 32 (± 2.7) GtCO2 / yr, or 69 % of global GHG emissions in 2010.2 
They grew further by about 3 % between 2010 and 2011 and by about 
1 – 2 % between 2011 and 2012. Agriculture, deforestation, and other 
land use changes have been the second-largest contributors whose 
emissions, including other GHGs, have reached 12 GtCO2eq / yr (low con-
fidence), 24 % of global GHG emissions in 2010. Since 1970, CO2 emis-
sions increased by about 90 %, and methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide 
(N2O) increased by about 47 % and 43 %, respectively. Fluorinated gases 
(F-gases) emitted in industrial processes continue to represent less than 
2 % of anthropogenic GHG emissions. Of the 49 (± 4.5) GtCO2eq / yr in 
total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010, CO2 remains the major 
anthropogenic GHG accounting for 76 % (38± 3.8 GtCO2eq / yr) of total 
anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010. 16 % (7.8± 1.6 GtCO2eq / yr) 
come from methane (CH4), 6.2 % (3.1± 1.9 GtCO2eq / yr) from nitrous 
oxide (N2O), and 2.0 % (1.0± 0.2 GtCO2eq / yr) from fluorinated gases. 
[5.2.1]
Over the last four decades GHG emissions have risen in every 
region other than Economies in Transition, though trends in 
the different regions have been dissimilar (high confidence). 
In Asia, GHG emissions grew by 330 % reaching 19  GtCO2eq / yr in 
1 Values with ± provide uncertainty ranges for a 90 % confidence interval.
2 Unless stated otherwise, all emission shares are calculated based on global 
warming potential with a 100-year time horizon. See also Section 3.9.6 for more 
information on emission metrics.
2010, in Middle East and Africa (MAF) by 70 %, in Latin America 
(LAM) by 57 %, in the group of member countries of the Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-
1990) by 22 %, and in Economies in Transition (EIT) by 4 %.3 
Although small in absolute terms, GHG emissions from international 
transportation are growing rapidly. [5.2.1]
Cumulative fossil CO2 emissions (since 1750) more than tripled 
from 420 GtCO2 by 1970 to 1300  GtCO2 (± 8 %) by 2010 (high 
confidence). Cumulative CO2 emissions associated with agriculture, 
deforestation, and other land use change (AFOLU) have increased 
from about 490 GtCO2 in 1970 to approximately 680 GtCO2 (± 45 %) 
in 2010. Considering cumulative CO2 emissions from 1750 to 2010, the 
OECD-1990 region continues to be the major contributor with 42 %; 
Asia with 22 % is increasing its share. [5.2.1]
In 2010, median per capita emissions for the group of high-
income countries (13 tCO2eq / cap) is almost 10 times that of 
low-income countries (1�4 tCO2eq / cap) (robust evidence, high 
agreement). Global average per capita GHG emissions have shown a 
stable trend over the last 40 years. This global average, however, masks 
the divergence that exists at the regional level; in 2010 per capita GHG 
emissions in OECD-1990 and EIT are between 1.9 and 2.7 times higher 
than per capita GHG emissions in LAM, MAF, and Asia. While per cap-
ita GHG emissions in LAM and MAF have been stable over the last four 
decades, in Asia they have increased by more than 120 %. [5.2.1]
The energy and industry sectors in upper-middle income countries 
accounted for 60 % of the rise in global GHG emissions between 
2000 and 2010 (high confidence). From 2000 – 2010, GHG emissions 
grew in all sectors, except in AFOLU where positive and negative emis-
sion changes are reported across different databases and uncertainties 
in the data are high: energy supply (+36 %, to 17 GtCO2eq / yr), indus-
try (+39 %, to 10 GtCO2eq / yr), transport (+18 %, to 7.0 GtCO2eq / yr), 
buildings (+9 %, to 3.2 GtCO2eq / yr), AFOLU (+8 %, to 12 GtCO2eq / yr).4 
Waste GHG emissions increased substantially but remained close to 
3 % of global GHG emissions. [5.3.4, 5.3.5]
In the OECD-1990 region, territorial CO2 emissions slightly 
decreased between 2000 and 2010, but consumption-based 
CO2 emissions increased by 5 % (robust evidence, high agreement). 
In most developed countries, both consumption-related emissions 
and GDP are growing. There is an emerging gap between territorial, 
3 The country compositions of OECD-1990, EIT, LAM, MAF, and ASIA are defined 
in Annex II.2 of the report. In Chapter 5, both ‘ASIA’ and ‘Asia’ refer to the same 
group of countries in the geographic region Asia. The region referred to excludes 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand; the latter countries are included in the OECD-
1990 region.
4 These numbers are from the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research 
(EDGAR) database (JRC / PBL, 2013). These data have high levels of uncertainty 
and differences between databases exist.
355
Drivers, Trends and Mitigation
5
Chapter 5
production-related emissions, and consumption-related emissions that 
include CO2 embedded in trade flows. The gap shows that a consider-
able share of CO2 emissions from fossil fuels combustion in developing 
countries is released in the production of goods exported to developed 
countries. By 2010, however, the developing country group has over-
taken the developed country group in terms of annual CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes from both produc-
tion and consumption perspectives. [5.3.3]
The trend of increasing fossil CO2 emissions is robust (very high 
confidence). Five different fossil fuel CO2 emissions datasets — harmo-
nized to cover fossil fuel, cement, bunker fuels, and gas flaring — show 
± 4 % differences over the last three decades. Uncertainties associated 
with estimates of historic anthropogenic GHG emissions vary by type 
of gas and decrease with the level of aggregation. Global CO2 emis-
sions from fossil fuels have relatively low uncertainty, assessed to be 
± 8 %. Uncertainty in fossil CO2 emissions at the country level reaches 
up to 50 %. [5.2.1, 5.2.3]
GHG-emissions drivers 
Per capita production and consumption growth is a major driver 
for worldwide increasing GHG emissions (robust evidence, high 
agreement). Global average economic growth, as measured through 
GDP per capita, grew by 100 %, from 4800 to 9800 Int$2005 / cap yr 
between 1970 and 2010, outpacing GHG-intensity improvements. At 
regional level, however, there are large variations. Although different in 
absolute values, OECD-1990 and LAM showed a stable growth in per 
capita income of the same order of magnitude as the GHG-intensity 
improvements. This led to almost constant per capita emissions and 
an increase in total emissions at the rate of population growth. The EIT 
showed a decrease in income around 1990 that together with decreas-
ing emissions per output and a very low population growth led to a 
decrease in overall emissions until 2000. The MAF showed a decrease 
in GDP per capita, but a high population growth rate led to an increase 
in overall emissions. Emerging economies in Asia showed very high 
economic growth rates at aggregate and per capita levels leading to 
the largest growth in per capita emissions despite also having the 
highest emissions per output efficiency improvements. [5.3.3]
Reductions in the energy intensity of economic output dur-
ing the past four decades have not been sufficient to offset 
the effect of GDP growth (high confidence). Energy intensity has 
declined in all developed and large developing countries due mainly to 
technology, changes in economic structure, the mix of energy sources, 
and changes in the participation of inputs such as capital and labour 
used. At the global level, per capita primary energy consumption rose 
by 30 % from 1970 – 2010; due to population growth, total energy use 
has increased by 130 % over the same period. Countries and regions 
with higher income per capita tend to have higher energy use per cap-
ita; per capita energy use in the developing regions is only about 25 % 
of that in the developed economies on average. Growth rates in energy 
use per capita in developing countries, however, are much higher than 
those in developed countries. [5.3.4]
The decreasing carbon intensity of energy supply has been 
insufficient to offset the increase in global energy use (high 
confidence). Increased use of coal since 2000 has reversed the slight 
decarbonization trends exacerbating the burden of energy-related 
GHG emissions. Estimates indicate that coal, and unconventional gas 
and oil resources are large, suggesting that decarbonization would not 
be primarily driven by the exhaustion of fossil fuels, but by economics 
and technological and socio-political decisions. [5.3.4, 5.8]
Population growth aggravates worldwide growth of GHG emis-
sions (high confidence). Global population has increased by 87 % from 
1970 reaching 6.9 billion in 2010. The population has increased mainly 
in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, but the emissions increase for an 
additional person varies widely, depending on geographical location, 
income, lifestyle, and the available energy resources and technologies. 
The gap in per capita emissions between the top and bottom countries 
exceeds a factor of 50. The effects of demographic changes such as 
urbanization, ageing, and household size have indirect effects on emis-
sions and smaller than the direct effects of changes in population size. 
[5.3.2]
Technological innovation and diffusion support overall eco-
nomic growth, and also determine the energy intensity of 
economic output and the carbon intensity of energy (medium 
confidence). At the aggregate level, between 1970 and 2010, techno-
logical change increased income and resources use, as past techno-
logical change has favoured labour-productivity increase over resource 
efficiency [5.6.1]. Innovations that potentially decrease emissions can 
trigger behavioural responses that diminish the potential gains from 
increased efficiency, a phenomenon called the ‘rebound effect’ [5.6.2]. 
Trade facilitates the diffusion of productivity-enhancing and emissions-
reducing technologies [5.4].
Infrastructural choices have long-lasting effects on emissions 
and may lock a country in a development path for decades 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). As an example, infrastructure 
and technology choices made by industrialized countries in the post-
World War II period, at low-energy prices, still have an effect on current 
worldwide GHG emissions. [5.6.3]
Behaviour affects emissions through energy use, technological 
choices, lifestyles, and consumption preferences (robust evidence, 
high agreement). Behaviour is rooted in individuals’ psychological, cul-
tural, and social orientations that lead to different lifestyles and con-
sumption patterns. Across countries, strategies and policies have been 
used to change individual choices, sometimes through changing the 
context in which decisions are made; a question remains whether such 
policies can be scaled up to macro level. [5.5]
Co-benefits may be particularly important for policymakers 
because the benefits can be realized faster than can benefits 
from reduced climate change, but they depend on assumptions 
about future trends (medium evidence, high agreement). Policies 
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addressing fossil fuel use may reduce not only CO2 emissions but also 
sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions and other pollutants that directly affect 
human health, but this effect interacts with future air pollution poli-
cies. Some mitigation policies may also produce adverse side-effects, 
by promoting energy supply technologies that increase some forms 
of air pollution. A comprehensive analysis of co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects is essential to estimate the actual costs of mitigation poli-
cies. [5.7]
Policies can be designed to act upon underlying drivers so 
as to decrease GHG emissions (limited evidence, medium agree-
ment). Policies can be designed and implemented to affect underly-
ing drivers. From 1970 – 2010, in most regions and countries, policies 
have proved insufficient in influencing infrastructure, technological, or 
behavioural choices at a scale that curbs the upward GHG-emissions 
trends. [5.6, 5.8]
5.1 Introduction and 
overview
The concentration of greenhouse gases, including CO2 and methane 
(CH4), in the atmosphere has been steadily rising since the beginning 
of the Industrial Revolution (Etheridge et al., 1996, 2002; NRC, 2010). 
Anthropogenic CO2 emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels 
have been the main contributor to rising CO2-concentration levels in 
the atmosphere, followed by CO2 emissions from land use, land use 
change, and forestry (LULUCF).
Chapter 5 analyzes the anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG)-emission 
trends until the present and the main drivers that explain those trends. 
This chapter serves as a reference for assessing, in following chapters, 
the potential future emissions paths, and mitigation measures.
For a systematic assessment of the main drivers of GHG-emission 
trends, this and subsequent chapters employ a decomposition analysis 
based on the IPAT and Kaya identities (see Box 5.1). 
Chapter 5 first considers the immediate drivers, or factors in the 
decomposition, of total GHG emissions. For energy, the factors are 
population, gross domestic product (GDP) (production) and gross 
national expenditure (GNE) (expenditures) per capita, energy inten-
sity of production and expenditures, and GHG-emissions intensity 
of energy. For other sectors, the last two factors are combined into 
GHG-emissions intensity of production or expenditures. Secondly, it 
considers the underlying drivers defined as the processes, mecha-
nisms, and characteristics of society that influence emissions through 
the factors, such as fossil fuels endowment and availability, consump-
tion patterns, structural and technological changes, and behavioural 
choices. 
Underlying drivers are subject to policies and measures that can be 
applied to, and act upon them. Changes in these underlying drivers, in 
turn, induce changes in the immediate drivers and, eventually, in the 
GHG-emissions trends.
The effect of immediate drivers on GHG emissions can be quantified 
through a straight decomposition analysis; the effect of underlying 
drivers on immediate drivers, however, is not straightforward and, for 
that reason, difficult to quantify in terms of their ultimate effects on 
GHG emissions. In addition, sometimes immediate drivers may affect 
underlying drivers in a reverse direction. Policies and measures in turn 
affect these interactions. Figure 5.1 reflects the interconnections 
among GHG emissions, immediate drivers, underlying drivers, and poli-
cies and measures as well as the interactions across these three groups 
through the dotted lines.
Past trends in global and regional GHG emissions from the beginning 
of the Industrial Revolution are presented in Section 5.2, Global trends 
in greenhouse gases and short-lived species; sectoral breakdowns of 
emissions trends are introduced later in Section 5.3.4, Energy demand 
and supply, and Section 5.3.5, Other key sectors, which includes trans-
port, buildings, industry, forestry, agriculture, and waste sectors.
The decomposition framework and its main results at both global and 
regional levels are presented in Section 5.3.1, Drivers of global emis-
sions. Immediate drivers or factors in the decomposition identity are 
discussed in Section 5.3.2, Population and demographic structure, 
Section 5.3.3, Economic growth and development, and Section 5.3.4, 
Energy demand and supply. Past trends of the immediate drivers are 
identified and analyzed in these sections.
At a deeper level, the underlying drivers that influence immediate 
drivers that, in turn, affect GHG emissions trends, are identified and 
discussed in Section 5.4, Production and trade patterns, Section 5.5, 
Consumption and behavioural change, and Section 5.6, Technological 
change. Underlying drivers include individual and societal choices as 
well as infrastructure and technological changes.
Section 5.7, Co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation actions, 
identifies the effects of mitigation policies, measures or actions on 
other development aspects such as energy security, and public health.
Section 5.8, The system perspective: linking sectors, technologies and 
consumption patterns, synthesizes the main findings of the chapter 
and highlights the relevant interactions among and across immediate 
and underlying drivers that may be key for the design of mitigation 
policies and measures.
Finally, Section 5.9, Gaps in knowledge and data, addresses shortcom-
ings in the dataset that prevent a more thorough analysis or limit the 
time span of certain variables. The section also discussed the gaps in 
the knowledge on the linkages among drivers and their effect on GHG 
emissions.
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Figure 5�1 | Interconnections among GHG emissions, immediate drivers, underlying drivers, and policies and measures. Immediate drivers comprise the factors in the decomposi-
tion of emissions. Underlying drivers refer to the processes, mechanisms, and characteristics that influence emissions through the factors. Policies and measures affect the underlying 
drivers that, in turn, may change the factors. Immediate and underlying drivers may, in return, influence policies and measures.
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5.2 Global trends in stocks and 
flows of greenhouse gases 
and short-lived species
5�2�1 Sectoral and regional trends in GHG 
emissions
Between 1970 and 2010, global warming potential (GWP)-weighted 
territorial GHG emissions increased from 27 to 49 GtCO2eq, an 80 % 
increase (Figure 5.2). Total GHG emissions increased by 8  GtCO2eq 
over the 1970s, 6 GtCO2eq over the 1980s, and by 2 GtCO2 over the 
1990s, estimated as linear trends. Emissions growth accelerated in the 
2000s for an increase of 10 GtCO2eq. The average annual GHG-growth 
rate over these decadal periods was 2.0 %, 1.4 %, 0.6 %, and 2.2 %.5 
The main regional changes underlying these global trends were the 
reduction in GHG emissions in the Economies in Transition (EIT) region 
5 Note that there are different methods to calculate the average annual growth 
rate. Here, for convenience of the reader, we take the simple linear average of the 
annual growth rates  g t within the period considered.
Underlying drivers are subject to policies and measures that can be 
applied to, and act upon them. Changes in these underlying drivers, in 
turn, induce changes in the immediate drivers and, eventually, in the 
GHG-emissions trends.
The effect of immediate drivers on GHG emissions can be quantified 
through a straight decomposition analysis; the effect of underlying 
drivers on immediate drivers, however, is not straightforward and, for 
that reason, difficult to quantify in terms of their ultimate effects on 
GHG emissions. In addition, sometimes immediate drivers may affect 
underlying drivers in a reverse direction. Policies and measures in turn 
affect these interactions. Figure 5.1 reflects the interconnections 
among GHG emissions, immediate drivers, underlying drivers, and poli-
cies and measures as well as the interactions across these three groups 
through the dotted lines.
Past trends in global and regional GHG emissions from the beginning 
of the Industrial Revolution are presented in Section 5.2, Global trends 
in greenhouse gases and short-lived species; sectoral breakdowns of 
emissions trends are introduced later in Section 5.3.4, Energy demand 
and supply, and Section 5.3.5, Other key sectors, which includes trans-
port, buildings, industry, forestry, agriculture, and waste sectors.
The decomposition framework and its main results at both global and 
regional levels are presented in Section 5.3.1, Drivers of global emis-
sions. Immediate drivers or factors in the decomposition identity are 
discussed in Section 5.3.2, Population and demographic structure, 
Section 5.3.3, Economic growth and development, and Section 5.3.4, 
Energy demand and supply. Past trends of the immediate drivers are 
identified and analyzed in these sections.
At a deeper level, the underlying drivers that influence immediate 
drivers that, in turn, affect GHG emissions trends, are identified and 
discussed in Section 5.4, Production and trade patterns, Section 5.5, 
Consumption and behavioural change, and Section 5.6, Technological 
change. Underlying drivers include individual and societal choices as 
well as infrastructure and technological changes.
Section 5.7, Co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation actions, 
identifies the effects of mitigation policies, measures or actions on 
other development aspects such as energy security, and public health.
Section 5.8, The system perspective: linking sectors, technologies and 
consumption patterns, synthesizes the main findings of the chapter 
and highlights the relevant interactions among and across immediate 
and underlying drivers that may be key for the design of mitigation 
policies and measures.
Finally, Section 5.9, Gaps in knowledge and data, addresses shortcom-
ings in the dataset that prevent a more thorough analysis or limit the 
time span of certain variables. The section also discussed the gaps in 
the knowledge on the linkages among drivers and their effect on GHG 
emissions.
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Figure 5�1 | Interconnections among GHG emissions, immediate drivers, underlying drivers, and policies and measures. Immediate drivers comprise the factors in the decomposi-
tion of emissions. Underlying drivers refer to the processes, mechanisms, and characteristics that influence emissions through the factors. Policies and measures affect the underlying 
drivers that, in turn, may change the factors. Immediate and underlying drivers may, in return, influence policies and measures.
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impact of a change in index values is on the weight given to methane, 
whose emission trends are particularly uncertain (Section  5.2.3; 
Kirschke et al., 2013).
Global per capita GHG emissions (Figure 5.2, right panel) have shown 
little trend over the last 40 years. The most noticeable regional trend 
over the last two decades in terms of per capita GHG emissions is the 
increase in Asia. Per capita emissions in regions other than EIT were 
fairly flat until the last several years when per capita emissions have 
decreased slightly in Latin America (LAM) and the group of member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment in 1990 (OECD-1990).
Fossil CO2 emissions have grown substantially over the past two cen-
turies (Figure 5.3, left panels). Fossil CO2 emissions over 2002 – 2011 
were estimated at 30 ± 8 % GtCO2 / yr (Andres et al., 2012), (90 % confi-
dence interval). Emissions in the 2000s as compared to the 1990s were 
higher in all regions, except for EIT, and the rate of increase was largest 
in ASIA. The increase in developing countries is due to an industrial-
ization process that historically has been energy-intensive; a pattern 
similar to what the current OECD countries experienced before 1970. 
The figure also shows a shift in relative contribution. The OECD-1990 
countries contributed most to the pre-1970 emissions, but in 2010 the 
developing countries and ASIA in particular, make up the major share 
of emissions.
Figure 5�2 | Left panel: GHG emissions per region over 1970 – 2010. Emissions include all sectors, sources and gases, are territorial (see Box 5.2), and aggregated using 100-year 
GWP values. Right panel: The same data presented as per capita GHG emissions. Data from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012). Regions are defined in Annex II.2.
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starting in the 1990s and the rapid increase in GHG emissions in Asia 
in the 2000s. Emissions values in Section 5.2 are from the Emissions 
Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) (JRC / PBL, 2013) 
unless otherwise noted. As in previous assessments, the EDGAR inven-
tory is used because it provides the only consistent and comprehensive 
estimate of global emissions over the last 40 years. The EDGAR emis-
sions estimates for specific compounds are compared to other results 
in the literature below.
Similar trends were seen for fossil CO2 emissions, where a longer 
record exists. The absolute growth rate over the last decade was 
8 GtCO2 / decade, which was higher than at any point in history (Boden 
et  al., 2012). The relative growth rate for per capita CO2 emissions 
over the last decade is still smaller than the per capita growth rates 
at previous points in history, such as during the post-World War II eco-
nomic expansion. Absolute rates of CO2 emissions growth, however, 
are higher than in the past due to an overall expansion of the global 
economy due to population growth.
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the largest component of anthropogenic GHG 
emissions (Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1). CO2 is released during the combus-
tion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and gas as well as the production of 
cement (Houghton, 2007). In 2010, CO2, including net land-use-change 
emissions, comprised over 75 % (38± 3.8 GtCO2eq / yr) of 100-year 
GWP-weighted anthropogenic GHG emissions (Figure 1.3). Between 
1970 – 2010, global anthropogenic fossil CO2 emissions more than 
doubled, while methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) each increased 
by about 45 %, although there is evidence that CH4 emissions may 
not have increased over recent decades (see Section 5.2.3). In 2010, 
their shares in total GHG emissions were 16 % (7.8± 1.6 GtCO2eq / yr) 
and 6.2 % (3.1± 1.9 GtCO2eq / yr) respectively. Fluorinated gases, 
which represented about 0.4 % in 1970, increased to comprise 2 % 
(1.0± 0.2 GtCO2eq / yr) of GHG emissions in 2010. Some anthropogenic 
influences on climate, such as chlorofluorocarbons and aviation con-
trails, are not discussed in this section, but are assessed in the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group I (WGI) 
contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (Boucher and Ran-
dall, 2013; Hartmann et  al., 2013). Forcing from aerosols and ozone 
precursor compounds are considered in the next section.
Following general scientific practice, 100-year GWPs from the IPCC 
Second Assessment Report (SAR) (Schimel et al., 1996) are used as the 
index for converting GHG emission estimates to common units of CO2-
equivalent emissions in this section (please refer to Annex II.9.1 for the 
exact values). There is no unique method of comparing trends for dif-
ferent climate-forcing agents (see Sections 1.2.5 and 3.9.6). A change 
to 20- or 500-year GWP values would change the trends by ± 6 %. 
Similarly, use of updated GWPs from the IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report (AR4) or AR5, which change values by a smaller amount, would 
not change the overall conclusions in this section. The largest absolute 
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impact of a change in index values is on the weight given to methane, 
whose emission trends are particularly uncertain (Section  5.2.3; 
Kirschke et al., 2013).
Global per capita GHG emissions (Figure 5.2, right panel) have shown 
little trend over the last 40 years. The most noticeable regional trend 
over the last two decades in terms of per capita GHG emissions is the 
increase in Asia. Per capita emissions in regions other than EIT were 
fairly flat until the last several years when per capita emissions have 
decreased slightly in Latin America (LAM) and the group of member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment in 1990 (OECD-1990).
Fossil CO2 emissions have grown substantially over the past two cen-
turies (Figure 5.3, left panels). Fossil CO2 emissions over 2002 – 2011 
were estimated at 30 ± 8 % GtCO2 / yr (Andres et al., 2012), (90 % confi-
dence interval). Emissions in the 2000s as compared to the 1990s were 
higher in all regions, except for EIT, and the rate of increase was largest 
in ASIA. The increase in developing countries is due to an industrial-
ization process that historically has been energy-intensive; a pattern 
similar to what the current OECD countries experienced before 1970. 
The figure also shows a shift in relative contribution. The OECD-1990 
countries contributed most to the pre-1970 emissions, but in 2010 the 
developing countries and ASIA in particular, make up the major share 
of emissions.
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes 
made up the largest share (78 %) of the total emission increase 
from 1970 to 2010, with a similar percentage contribution between 
2000 and 2010. In 2011, fossil CO2 emissions were 3 % higher than 
in 2010, taking the average of estimates from Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) / Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) (Olivier 
et al., 2013), U. S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), and Car-
bon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) (Macknick, 2011). 
Preliminary estimates for 2012 indicate that emissions growth has 
slowed to 1.4 % (Olivier et al., 2013) or 2 % (BP, 2013), as compared 
to 2012.
Land-use-change (LUC) emissions are highly uncertain, with emis-
sions over 2002 – 2011 estimated to be 3.3 ± 50 – 75 % GtCO2 / yr 
(Ciais et al., 2013). One estimate of LUC emissions by region is shown 
in Figure 5.3, left panel (Houghton et al., 2012), disaggregated into 
sub-regions using Houghton (2008), and extended to 1750 using 
regional trends from Pongratz et al. (2009). LUC emissions were com-
parable to or greater than fossil emissions for much of the last two 
centuries, but are of the order of 10 % of fossil emissions by 2010. 
LUC emissions appear to be declining over the last decade, with 
some regions showing net carbon uptake, although estimates do not 
agree on the rate or magnitude of these changes (Figure 11.6). 
Uncertainty estimates in Figure 5.3 follow Le Quéré et al.(2012) and 
WGI (Ciais et al., 2013). 
Figure 5�2 | Left panel: GHG emissions per region over 1970 – 2010. Emissions include all sectors, sources and gases, are territorial (see Box 5.2), and aggregated using 100-year 
GWP values. Right panel: The same data presented as per capita GHG emissions. Data from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012). Regions are defined in Annex II.2.
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Cumulative CO2 emissions, which are a rough measure of the 
impact of past emissions on atmospheric concentrations, are also 
shown in Figure 5.3 (right panels). About half of cumulative fossil 
CO2 emissions to 2010 were from the OECD-1990 region, 20 % from 
the EIT region, 15 % from the ASIA region, and the remainder from 
LAM, MAF, and international shipping (not shown). The cumulative 
contribution of LUC emissions was similar to that of fossil fuels until 
the late 20th century. By 2010, however, cumulative fossil emis-
sions are nearly twice that of cumulative LUC emissions. Note that 
the figures for LUC are illustrative, and are much more uncertain 
than the estimates of fossil CO2 emissions. Cumulative fossil CO2 
emissions to 2011 are estimated to be 1340 ± 110 GtCO2, while 
cumulative LUC emissions are 680 ± 300 GtCO2 (WGI Table 6.1). 
Cumulative uncertainties are, conservatively, estimated across time 
periods with 100 % correlation across years. Cumulative per capita 
emissions are another method of presenting emissions in the con-
text of examining historical responsibility (see Chapters 3 and 13; 
Teng et al., 2011).
Methane is the second most important greenhouse gas, although its 
apparent impact in these figures is sensitive to the index used to convert 
to CO2 equivalents (see Section 3.9.6). Methane emissions are due to 
a wide range of anthropogenic activities including the production and 
transport of fossil fuels, livestock, and rice cultivation, and the decay of 
organic waste in solid waste landfills. The 2005 estimate of CH4 emissions 
from JRC / PBL (2013) of 7.3 GtCO2eq is 7 % higher than the 6.8 GtCO2eq 
estimates of US EPA (2012) and Höglund-Isaksson et al. (2012), which is 
well within an estimated 20 % uncertainty (Section 5.2.3).
The third most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas is N2O, which 
is emitted during agricultural and industrial activities as well as dur-
ing combustion and human waste disposal. Current estimates are that 
about 40 % of total N20 emissions are anthropogenic. The 2005 esti-
mate of N2O emissions from JRC / PBL (2013) of 3.0 GtCO2eq is 12 % 
lower than the 3.4 GtCO2 estimate of US EPA (2012), which is well 
within an estimated 30 to 90 % uncertainty (Section 5.2.3).
In addition to CO2, CH4, and N2O, the F-gases are also greenhouse 
gases, and include hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur 
hexafluoride. These gases, sometimes referred to as High Global Warm-
ing Potential gases (‘High GWP gases’), are typically emitted in smaller 
quantities from a variety of industrial processes. Hydrofluorocarbons are 
mostly used as substitutes for ozone-depleting substances (i. e., chloro-
fluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), and halons). 
Emissions uncertainty for these gases varies, although for those gases 
with known atmospheric lifetimes, atmospheric measurements can be 
inverted to obtain an estimate of total global emissions. Overall, the 
uncertainty in global F-gas emissions have been estimated to be 20 % 
(UNEP, 2012, appendix), although atmospheric inversions constrain 
emissions to lower uncertainty levels in some cases (Section 5.2.3).
Greenhouse gases are emitted from many societal activities, with 
global emissions from the energy sector consistently increasing the 
most each decade over the last 40 years (see also Figure 5.18). A nota-
ble change over the last decade is high growth in emissions from the 
industrial sector, the second highest growth by sector over this period. 
Subsequent sections of this chapter describe the main trends and driv-
ers associated with these activities and prospects for future mitigation 
options.
5�2�2 Trends in aerosols and aerosol / tropos-
pheric ozone precursors
In addition to GHGs, aerosols and tropospheric ozone also contribute 
to trends in climate forcing. Because these forcing agents are shorter 
lived and heterogeneous, their impact on climate is not discussed in 
terms of concentrations, but instead in terms of radiative forcing, 
which is the change in the radiative energy budget of the Earth 
(Myhre et al., 2014). A positive forcing, such as that due to increases 
in GHGs, tends to warm the system while a negative forcing repre-
sents a cooling effect. Trends for the relevant emissions are shown in 
the Figure 5.4. 
Aerosols contribute a net negative, but uncertain, radiative forc-
ing (IPCC, 2007a; Myhre et al., 2014) estimated to total – 0.90 W / m2 
(5 – 95 % range: – 1.9 to – 0.1 W / m2). Trends in atmospheric aerosol 
loading, and the associated radiative forcing, are influenced primar-
ily by trends in primary aerosol, black carbon (BC) and organic car-
bon (OC), and precursor emissions (primarily sulphur dioxide (SO2)), 
although trends in climate and land-use also impact these forcing 
agents. 
Sulphur dioxide is the largest anthropogenic source of aerosols, and is 
emitted by fossil fuel combustion, metal smelting, and other industrial 
processes. Global sulphur emissions peaked in the 1970s, and have 
generally decreased since then. Uncertainty in global SO2 emissions 
over this period is estimated to be relatively low (± 10 %), although 
regional uncertainty can be higher (Smith et al., 2011). 
A recent update of carbonaceous aerosol emissions trends (BC and 
OC) found an increase from 1970 through 2000, with a particularly 
notable increase in BC emissions from 1970 to 1980 (Lamarque et al., 
2010). A recent assessment indicates that BC and OC emissions may 
be underestimated (Bond et al., 2013). These emissions are highly sen-
sitive to combustion conditions, which results in a large uncertainty 
(+100 % / – 50 %; Bond et  al., 2007). Global emissions from 2000 to 
2010 have not yet been estimated, but will depend on the trends in 
driving forces such as residential coal and biofuel use, which are poorly 
quantified, and petroleum consumption for transport, but also changes 
in technology characteristics and the implementation of emission 
reduction technologies. 
Because of the large uncertainty in aerosol forcing effects, the trend in 
aerosol forcing over the last two decades is not clear (Shindell et al., 
2013).
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Tropospheric ozone contributes a positive forcing and is formed by 
chemical reactions in the atmosphere. Ozone concentrations are 
impacted by a variety of emissions, including CH4, nitrogen oxides 
(NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), and volatile organic hydrocarbons (VOC) 
(Myhre et al., 2014). Global emissions of ozone precursor compounds 
are also thought to have increased over the last four decades. Global 
uncertainty has not been quantified for these emissions. An uncertainty 
of 10 – 20 % for 1990 NOx emissions has been estimated in various 
European countries (Schöpp et al., 2005). 
5�2�3 Emissions uncertainty
5�2�3�1 Methods for emissions uncertainty estimation
There are multiple methods of estimating emissions uncertainty (Mar-
land et  al., 2009), although almost all methods include an element 
of expert judgement. The traditional uncertainty estimation method, 
which compares emissions estimates to independent measurements, 
fails because of a mismatch in spatial and temporal scales. The data 
required for emission estimates, ranging from emission factors to 
fuel consumption data, originate from multiple sources that rarely 
have well characterized uncertainties. A potentially useful input to 
uncertainty estimates is a comparison of somewhat independent esti-
mates of emissions, ideally over time, although care must be taken to 
assure that data cover the same source categories (Macknick, 2011; 
Andres et al., 2012). Formal uncertainty propagation can be useful as 
well (UNEP, 2012; Elzen et al., 2013) although one poorly constrained 
element of such analysis is the methodology for aggregating uncer-
tainty between regions. Uncertainties in this section are presented as 
5 – 95 % confidence intervals, with values from the literature converted 
to this range where necessary assuming a Gaussian uncertainty dis-
tribution.
Total GHG emissions from EDGAR as presented here are up to 5 – 10 % 
lower over 1970 – 2004 than the earlier estimates presented in AR4 
(IPCC, 2007a). The lower values here are largely due to lower estimates 
of LUC CO2 emissions (by 0 – 50 %) and N2O emissions (by 20 – 40 %) 
and fossil CO2 emissions (by 0 – 5 %). These differences in these emis-
sions are within the uncertainty ranges estimated for these emission 
categories.
5�2�3�2 Fossil carbon dioxide emissions uncertainty
Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and cement production 
are considered to have relatively low uncertainty, with global uncer-
tainty recently assessed to be 8 % (Andres et al., 2012). Uncertainties 
in fossil-fuel CO2 emissions arise from uncertainty in fuel combustion 
or other activity data and uncertainties in emission factors, as well as 
assumptions for combustion completeness and non-combustion uses. 
Default uncertainty estimates (two standard deviations) suggested 
by the IPCC (2006) for fossil fuel combustion emission factors are 
lower for fuels that have relatively uniform properties (– 3 % / +5 % 
for motor gasoline, – 2 % / +1 % for gas / diesel oil) and higher for 
most each decade over the last 40 years (see also Figure 5.18). A nota-
ble change over the last decade is high growth in emissions from the 
industrial sector, the second highest growth by sector over this period. 
Subsequent sections of this chapter describe the main trends and driv-
ers associated with these activities and prospects for future mitigation 
options.
5�2�2 Trends in aerosols and aerosol / tropos-
pheric ozone precursors
In addition to GHGs, aerosols and tropospheric ozone also contribute 
to trends in climate forcing. Because these forcing agents are shorter 
lived and heterogeneous, their impact on climate is not discussed in 
terms of concentrations, but instead in terms of radiative forcing, 
which is the change in the radiative energy budget of the Earth 
(Myhre et al., 2014). A positive forcing, such as that due to increases 
in GHGs, tends to warm the system while a negative forcing repre-
sents a cooling effect. Trends for the relevant emissions are shown in 
the Figure 5.4. 
Aerosols contribute a net negative, but uncertain, radiative forc-
ing (IPCC, 2007a; Myhre et al., 2014) estimated to total – 0.90 W / m2 
(5 – 95 % range: – 1.9 to – 0.1 W / m2). Trends in atmospheric aerosol 
loading, and the associated radiative forcing, are influenced primar-
ily by trends in primary aerosol, black carbon (BC) and organic car-
bon (OC), and precursor emissions (primarily sulphur dioxide (SO2)), 
although trends in climate and land-use also impact these forcing 
agents. 
Sulphur dioxide is the largest anthropogenic source of aerosols, and is 
emitted by fossil fuel combustion, metal smelting, and other industrial 
processes. Global sulphur emissions peaked in the 1970s, and have 
generally decreased since then. Uncertainty in global SO2 emissions 
over this period is estimated to be relatively low (± 10 %), although 
regional uncertainty can be higher (Smith et al., 2011). 
A recent update of carbonaceous aerosol emissions trends (BC and 
OC) found an increase from 1970 through 2000, with a particularly 
notable increase in BC emissions from 1970 to 1980 (Lamarque et al., 
2010). A recent assessment indicates that BC and OC emissions may 
be underestimated (Bond et al., 2013). These emissions are highly sen-
sitive to combustion conditions, which results in a large uncertainty 
(+100 % / – 50 %; Bond et  al., 2007). Global emissions from 2000 to 
2010 have not yet been estimated, but will depend on the trends in 
driving forces such as residential coal and biofuel use, which are poorly 
quantified, and petroleum consumption for transport, but also changes 
in technology characteristics and the implementation of emission 
reduction technologies. 
Because of the large uncertainty in aerosol forcing effects, the trend in 
aerosol forcing over the last two decades is not clear (Shindell et al., 
2013).
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Figure 5�4 | Left panel: Global trends for air pollutant and methane emissions from anthropogenic and open burning, normalized to 1970 values. Short-timescale variability, in 
carbon monoxide (CO) and non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC) in particular, is due to grassland and forest burning. Data from JRC / PBL (2013), except for SO2 
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fuels with more diverse properties (– 15 % / +18 % petroleum coke, 
– 10 % / +14 % for lignite). Some emissions factors used by country 
inventories, however, differ from the suggested defaults by amounts 
that are outside the stated uncertainty range because of local fuel 
practices (Olivier et al., 2011). In a study examining power plant emis-
sions in the United States, measured CO2 emissions were an average 
of 5 % higher than calculated emissions, with larger deviations for 
individual plants (Ackerman and Sundquist, 2008). A comparison of 
five different fossil fuel CO2 emissions datasets, harmonized to cover 
most of the same sources (fossil fuel, cement, bunker fuels, gas flar-
ing) shows ± 4 % differences over the last three decades (Macknick, 
2011). Uncertainty in underlying energy production and consumption 
statistics, which are drawn from similar sources for existing emission 
estimates, will contribute further to uncertainty (Gregg et al., 2008; 
Guan et al., 2012).
Uncertainty in fossil CO2 emissions increases at the country level (Mar-
land et al., 1999; Macknick, 2011; Andres et al., 2012), with differences 
between estimates of up to 50 %. Figure 5.5 compares five estimates 
of fossil CO2 emissions for several countries. For some countries the 
estimates agree well while for others more substantial differences 
exist. A high level of agreement between estimates, however, can arise 
due to similar assumptions and data sources and does not necessarily 
imply an equally low level of uncertainty. Note that differences in 
treatment of biofuels and international bunker fuels at the country 
level can contribute to differences seen in this comparison.
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5�2�3�3 Other greenhouse gases and non-fossil fuel 
carbon dioxide
Uncertainty is particularly large for sources without a simple relation-
ship to activity factors, such as emissions from LUC (Houghton et al., 
2012; see also Chapter 11 for a comprehensive discussion), fugitive 
emissions of CH4 and fluorinated gases (Hayhoe et al., 2002), and bio-
genic emissions of CH4 and N2O, and gas flaring (Macknick, 2011). 
Formally estimating uncertainty for LUC emissions is difficult because 
a number of relevant processes are not characterized well enough to 
be included in estimates (Houghton et al., 2012). 
Methane emissions are more uncertain than CO2, with fewer global 
estimates (US EPA, 2012; Höglund-Isaksson et  al., 2012; JRC / PBL, 
2013). The relationship between emissions and activity levels for CH4 
are highly variable, leading to greater uncertainty in emission esti-
mates. Leakage rates, for example, depend on equipment design, envi-
ronmental conditions, and maintenance procedures. Emissions from 
anaerobic decomposition (ruminants, rice, landfill) also are dependent 
on environmental conditions.
Nitrogen oxide emission factors are also heterogeneous, leading to 
large uncertainty. Bottom-up (inventory) estimates of uncertainty of 
25 % (UNEP, 2012) are smaller than the uncertainty of 60 % estimated 
by constraining emissions with atmospheric concentration observation 
and estimates of removal rates (Ciais et al., 2013). 
Unlike CO2, CH4, and N2O, most fluorinated gases are purely anthropo-
genic in origin, simplifying estimates. Bottom up emissions, however, 
depend on assumed rates of leakage, for example, from refrigeration 
units. Emissions can be estimated using concentration data together 
with inverse modelling techniques, resulting in global uncertainties of 
20 – 80 % for various perfluorocarbons (Ivy et  al., 2012), 8 – 11 % for 
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) (Rigby et al., 2010), and ± 6 – 11 % for HCFC-
22 (Saikawa et al., 2012).6
5�2�3�4 Total greenhouse gas uncertainty
Estimated uncertainty ranges for GHGs range from relatively low for 
fossil fuel CO2 (± 8 %), to intermediate values for CH4 and the F-gases 
(± 20 %), to higher values for N2O (± 60 %) and net LUC CO2 (50 – 75 %). 
Few estimates of total GHG uncertainty exist, and it should be noted 
that any such estimates are contingent on the index used to convert 
emissions to CO2 equivalent values. The uncertainty estimates quoted 
here are also not time-dependent. In reality, the most recent data is 
generally more uncertain due to the preliminary nature of much of the 
information used to calculate estimates. Data for historical periods can 
also be more uncertain due to less extensive data collection infrastruc-
ture and the lack of emission factor measurements for technologies no 
6 HCFC-22 is regulated under the Montreal Protocol but not included in fluorinated 
gases totals reported in this chapter as it is not included in the Kyoto Protocol.
longer in use. Uncertainty can also change over time due to changes in 
regional and sector contributions.
An illustrative uncertainty estimate of around 10 % for total GHG 
emissions can be obtained by combining the uncertainties for each gas 
assuming complete independence (which may underestimate actual 
uncertainty). An estimate of 7.5 % (90 percentile range) was provided 
by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Gap Report 
(UNEP, 2012, appendix), which is lower largely due to a lower uncer-
tainty for fossil CO2.
5�2�3�5 Sulphur dioxide and aerosols
Uncertainties in SO2 and carbonaceous aerosol (BC and OC) emissions 
have been estimated by Smith et  al. (2011) and Bond et  al. (2004, 
2007). Sulphur dioxide emissions uncertainty at the global level is rela-
tively low because uncertainties in fuel sulphur content are not well 
correlated between regions. Uncertainty at the regional level ranges 
up to 35 %. Uncertainties in carbonaceous aerosol emissions, in con-
trast, are high at both regional and global scales due to fundamental 
uncertainty in emission factors. Carbonaceous aerosol emissions are 
highly state-dependent, with emissions factors that can vary by over 
an order of magnitude depending on combustion conditions and emis-
sion controls. A recent assessment indicated that BC emissions may be 
substantially underestimated (Bond et al., 2013), supporting the litera-
ture estimates of high uncertainty for these emissions.
5�2�3�6 Uncertainties in emission trends
For global fossil CO2, the increase over the last decade as well as previ-
ous decades was larger than estimated uncertainties in annual emis-
sions, meaning that the trend of increasing emissions is robust. Uncer-
tainties can, however, impact the trends of fossil emissions of specific 
countries if increases are less rapid and uncertainties are sufficiently 
high. 
Quantification of uncertainties is complicated by uncertainties not only 
in annual uncertainty determinations but also by potential year-to-year 
uncertainty correlations (Ballantyne et al., 2010, 2012). For fossil CO2, 
these correlations are most closely tied to fuel use estimates, an inte-
gral part of the fossil CO2 emission calculation. For other emissions, 
errors in other drivers or emission factors may have their own temporal 
trends as well. Without explicit temporal uncertainty considerations, 
the true emission trends may deviate slightly from the estimated ones. 
In contrast to fossil-fuel emissions, uncertainties in global LUC emis-
sions are sufficiently high to make trends over recent decades uncer-
tain in direction and magnitude (see also Chapter 11). 
While two global inventories both indicate that anthropogenic meth-
ane emissions have increased over the last three decades, a recent 
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assessment combining atmospheric measurements, inventories, and 
modelling concluded that anthropogenic methane emissions are 
likely to have been flat or have declined over this period (Kirschke 
et al., 2013). The EDGAR inventory estimates an 86-Mt-CH4 (or 30 %) 
increase over 1980 – 2010 and the EPA (2012) historical estimate has 
a 26-Mt-CH4 increase from 1990 – 2005 (with a further 18-Mt-CH4 pro-
jected increase to 2010). (Kirschke et al., 2013) derives either a 5-Mt 
increase or a net 15-Mt decrease over this period, which indicates 
the inventories may be overestimating the increase in anthropogenic 
methane emissions. These results suggest that estimates of methane 
emission uncertainties of 20 % (UNEP, 2012; Kirschke et  al., 2013) 
for anthropogenic emissions may be too low, since the differences in 
trend between inventories and the inversion synthesis are of this mag-
nitude.
Overall, global SO2 emissions have decreased over the last two 
decades, decreasing again in recent years following an increase from 
about 2000 – 2005 (Klimont et  al., 2013). Global trends in carbona-
ceous aerosols over the past decade have not been estimated, how-
ever, BC and OC emissions from fuel combustion in China and India 
were estimated to have increased over 2000 – 2010 (Lu et al., 2011).
5�2�3�7 Uncertainties in consumption-based carbon 
dioxide emission accounts
Consumption-based CO2 emission accounts reallocate part of the ter-
ritorial CO2 emissions associated with the production of exports to 
the countries where they are eventually consumed (Peters, 2008; Minx 
et al., 2009). Different techniques and assumptions have been applied 
in modelling consumption-based CO2 emissions including aggregation 
or disaggregation of production sectors (Lenzen, 2011; Lindner et al., 
2012, 2013); consideration of price and deflation effects (Dietzen-
bacher and Hoen, 1998; Dietzenbacher and Wagener, 1999); use of bal-
ancing techniques for data discrepancies (Rey et al., 2004; Lenzen et al., 
2009, 2010); simplifying multi-regional input-output models (Nansai 
et al., 2009a); and use of domestic production structure as a proxy for 
imports (Suh, 2005). Different models and assumptions result in sub-
stantially different estimates of consumption-based CO2 emissions, but 
a direct comparison between these remains a gap in the literature.
Uncertainties in consumption-based emission accounts arise from 
various sources (Lenzen et al., 2010) including (1) uncertainty in the 
territory-based emission estimates (see previous sections); (2)  uncer-
tainties in input-output and international trade statistics (Lenzen et al., 
2010); and (3) uncertainties in the definitions, level of aggregation, and 
assumptions underlying the model (Peters and Solli, 2010; Kanemoto 
et al., 2012; Andres et al., 2012). 
There has been little quantitative analysis of this at the global level, 
with only a few comparisons across different versions of the same 
dataset (Andrew and Peters, 2013) and direct comparisons between 
studies (Andres et al., 2012). However, there have been detailed stud-
ies at the country level (Lenzen et al., 2010) and many of the mecha-
nisms of uncertainty are understood. 
The few quantitative studies on the uncertainty and model spread in 
global analyses confirm that the uncertainty in consumption-based 
emissions are larger than territorial emissions, though trends over time 
are likely to be robust (Andres et al., 2012). The uncertainty in territorial 
emission estimates is a key driver for the uncertainty in consumption-
based emissions, and differences in definition and system boundaries 
can lead to important differences (Peters and Solli, 2010). A detailed 
assessment of the uncertainty due to different supply chain models is 
lacking, and this remains a large gap in the literature. Based on model 
comparisons, particularly for large countries or regions, the uncertain-
ties may be less important than the uncertainties in territorial emission 
estimates used as inputs.
5.3 Key drivers of 
global change
5�3�1 Drivers of global emissions
This section analyzes drivers of the global trends in GHG emissions 
that were discussed in Section 5.2. In general, drivers are the elements 
that directly or indirectly contribute to GHG emissions. While there is 
no general consensus in the literature, some researchers distinguish 
proximate versus underlying or ultimate drivers (see e. g., Angel et al., 
1998; Geist and Lambin, 2002), where proximate drivers are generally 
the activities that are directly or closely related to the generation of 
GHGs and underlying or ultimate drivers are the ones that motivate 
the proximate drivers. 
There is neither a unique method to identify the drivers of climate 
change, nor can the drivers always be objectively defined: human 
activities manifest themselves through a complex network of inter-
actions, and isolating a clear cause-and-effect for a certain phenom-
enon purely through the lens of scientific observation is often difficult. 
Therefore, the term, ‘driver’ may not represent an exact causality but is 
used to indicate an association to provide insights on what constitutes 
overall changes in global GHG emissions.
In the literature, studies recognize various factors as main drivers to 
GHG emissions including consumption (Morioka and Yoshida, 1995; 
Munksgaard et al., 2001; Wier et al., 2001; Hertwich and Peters, 2009), 
international trade (Weber and Matthews, 2007; Peters and Hertwich, 
2008; Li and Hewitt, 2008; Yunfeng and Laike, 2010; Peters et al., 2011; 
Jakob and Marschinski, 2013), population growth (Ehrlich and Holdren, 
1971; O’Neill et al., 2010), economic growth (Grossman and Krueger, 
1994; Arrow et al, 1996; Stern et al., 1996; Lim et al., 2009; Blodgett 
and Parker, 2010; Carson, 2010), structural change to a service econ-
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ies at the country level (Lenzen et al., 2010) and many of the mecha-
nisms of uncertainty are understood. 
The few quantitative studies on the uncertainty and model spread in 
global analyses confirm that the uncertainty in consumption-based 
emissions are larger than territorial emissions, though trends over time 
are likely to be robust (Andres et al., 2012). The uncertainty in territorial 
emission estimates is a key driver for the uncertainty in consumption-
based emissions, and differences in definition and system boundaries 
can lead to important differences (Peters and Solli, 2010). A detailed 
assessment of the uncertainty due to different supply chain models is 
lacking, and this remains a large gap in the literature. Based on model 
comparisons, particularly for large countries or regions, the uncertain-
ties may be less important than the uncertainties in territorial emission 
estimates used as inputs.
5.3 Key drivers of 
global change
5�3�1 Drivers of global emissions
This section analyzes drivers of the global trends in GHG emissions 
that were discussed in Section 5.2. In general, drivers are the elements 
that directly or indirectly contribute to GHG emissions. While there is 
no general consensus in the literature, some researchers distinguish 
proximate versus underlying or ultimate drivers (see e. g., Angel et al., 
1998; Geist and Lambin, 2002), where proximate drivers are generally 
the activities that are directly or closely related to the generation of 
GHGs and underlying or ultimate drivers are the ones that motivate 
the proximate drivers. 
There is neither a unique method to identify the drivers of climate 
change, nor can the drivers always be objectively defined: human 
activities manifest themselves through a complex network of inter-
actions, and isolating a clear cause-and-effect for a certain phenom-
enon purely through the lens of scientific observation is often difficult. 
Therefore, the term, ‘driver’ may not represent an exact causality but is 
used to indicate an association to provide insights on what constitutes 
overall changes in global GHG emissions.
In the literature, studies recognize various factors as main drivers to 
GHG emissions including consumption (Morioka and Yoshida, 1995; 
Munksgaard et al., 2001; Wier et al., 2001; Hertwich and Peters, 2009), 
international trade (Weber and Matthews, 2007; Peters and Hertwich, 
2008; Li and Hewitt, 2008; Yunfeng and Laike, 2010; Peters et al., 2011; 
Jakob and Marschinski, 2013), population growth (Ehrlich and Holdren, 
1971; O’Neill et al., 2010), economic growth (Grossman and Krueger, 
1994; Arrow et al, 1996; Stern et al., 1996; Lim et al., 2009; Blodgett 
and Parker, 2010; Carson, 2010), structural change to a service econ-
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omy (Suh, 2006; Nansai et al., 2009b), and energy consumption (Wier, 
1998; Malla, 2009; Bolla and Pendolovska, 2011). Each of these topics 
will be discussed in more depth, starting in Section 5.3.2. 
Obviously many drivers of GHG emissions are interlinked with each 
other, and furthermore, many of these drivers can be further decom-
posed into various subcomponents. For example, transportation emis-
sions are an important driver of increasing GHG emissions globally. 
But there is a wide regional variation in its significance. Furthermore, 
the increase in vehicle miles driven per capita or changes in fuel econ-
omy of average vehicle fleet can also be referred to as a driver, while 
these drivers are underlying to the higher-level driver, namely changes 
to transportation emissions. Therefore, drivers to GHG emissions can 
only be understood in the context of scale, level of detail, and the 
framework under which the factors contributing to GHG emissions are 
analyzed.
5�3�1�1 Key drivers
Figure 5.6 shows that, globally AFOLU emissions have increased by 
12 % between 1970 and 2010. The AFOLU emissions have been more 
pronounced in non-OECD-1990 regions and dominate total GHG emis-
sions from MAF and LAM regions. Major increases in global GHG emis-
sion have been, however, associated with CO2 emissions from fossil 
energy (+108 % between 1970 and 2010), which has been growing 
more rapidly since AR4 (IPCC, 2007b).
Figure 5.7 shows this increase in fossil energy CO2 decomposed into 
changes in population (+87 %), per capita GDP adjusted with Pur-
chasing Power Parity (PPP) (+103 %), energy intensity in GDP (– 35 %) 
and CO2 intensity of energy (– 15 %) between 1970 and 2010. Over 
the last decade, however, the long trend of decreasing carbon inten-
sity in energy has been broken, and it increased by 1.7 %. In short, the 
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improvements in energy intensity of GDP that the world has achieved 
over the last four decades could not keep up with the continuous 
growth of global population resulting in a closely synchronous behav-
iour between GDP per capita and CO2 emission during the period.
At a regional scale, all regions but Asia show 5 % to 25 % reduction in 
CO2 intensity of energy consumption, while Asia increased CO2 inten-
sity of energy consumption by 44 % between 1970 and 2010. Energy 
intensity of GDP declined significantly in the EIT, ASIA, and OECD-1990 
(39 % – 55 %) and moderately in LAM (9 %), while in MAF it increased by 
41 %. Energy intensity of GDP may increase as an economy enters into 
an industrialization process, while it generally decreases as the indus-
trialization process matures and as the share of service sector in the 
economy grows (Nansai et al., 2007; Henriques and Kander, 2010). In all 
regions, population growth has been a persistent trend. The EIT region 
showed the lowest population growth rate over the last four decades 
(16 %), whereas MAF marked 188 % increase in population during the 
same period. ASIA gained the most to its population from 1.9 billion to 
3.7 billion during the period. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP-) adjusted 
GDP also grew in all regions ranging from 43 % (MAF), about two-fold 
(OECD-1990, EIT, and LAM) to a remarkable six-fold increase (ASIA) over 
the last four decades. In general, the use of PPP-adjusted GDP instead of 
Market Exchange Rate (MER)-based GDP gives more weight to develop-
ing economies and their GDP growth (Raupach et al., 2007).
In summary, the improvements in energy intensity in GDP over the last 
four decades could not keep up with the stable and persistent upward 
trends in GDP per capita and population. In particular, a strong growth 
in GDP per capita in ASIA combined with its population growth has 
been the most significant factors to the increase in GHG emissions dur-
ing the period.
Global CO2 emissions from fossil energy are decomposed into three 
factors using territorial and consumption accounts. Figure 5.8 high-
Figure 5�7 | Four factor decomposition of territorial CO2 emission from fossil fuel combustion at regional level over 1970 – 2010. Note that only the bottom-right panel for the 
World has a different scale for its vertical axis. Data from IEA (2012) and JRC / PBL (2013); based on PPP-adjusted GDP. Regions are defined in Annex II.2.
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lights the case of ASIA and OECD-1990, where the gap between the 
two approaches is largest, over the 1990 – 2010 period. Based on a ter-
ritorial accounting, OECD-1990 increased its CO2 emissions from fossil 
energy only by 6 % from 1990 to 2010. The increase in CO2 emission 
from fossil energy embodied in consumption by OECD-1990, however, 
is more significant (22 %) during the period. On the other hand, CO2 
emission embodied in consumption by ASIA increased by 175 % during 
the period, while its territorial emissions increased by 197 % during the 
period. Increasing international trade played an important role in this 
result, which will be elaborated in Section 5.4.
The strong correlation between GDP and CO2 emissions can be iden-
tified from the historical trajectories of CO2 emissions and GDP (Fig-
ure 5.9). Although there are notable exceptions (EIT), regional CO2 
emission trajectories are closely aligned with the growth in GDP. On 
average, 1 % of world GDP increase has been associated with 0.39 % 
increase in fossil energy CO2 emission during the 1970 – 2010 period. 
Over the last two decades, however, 1 % of world GDP increase has 
been accompanied with 0.49 % increase in fossil energy CO2 emission 
(1990 – 2010) due largely to the rapid growth of the energy-intensive 
non-OECD Asian economy.
Overall, the growth in production and consumption outpaced the 
reduction in CO2 emissions intensity of production and that embodied 
in consumption. Together with the growth in population, global CO2 
emissions from fossil energy maintained a stable upward trend, which 
characterizes the overall increase in global GHG emissions over the 
last two decades.
Figure 5�8 | Three factor decomposition of consumption-based and territorial CO2 emission from fossil fuel combustion for Asia (left) and OECD (right) over 1990 – 2010. Data from 
IEA (2012) and JRC / PBL (2013). Regions are defined in Annex II.2.
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5�3�2 Population and demographic structure
5�3�2�1 Population trends
In the second half of the 19th century, global population increased at 
an average annual rate of 0.55 %, but it accelerated after 1900. Popu-
lation size and age composition are driven by fertility and mortality 
rates, which in turn depend on a range of factors, including income, 
education, social norms, and health provisions that keep changing over 
time, partly in response to government policies. Section 4.3.1 discusses 
these processes in depth. Figure 5.10 presents the main outcomes. 
Between 1970 and 2010, global population has increased by 87 %, 
from 3.7 billion to 6.9 billion (Wang et al., 2012a). The underlying pro-
cess is the demographic transition in which societies move from a rela-
tively stable population level at high fertility and mortality rates, 
through a period of declined mortality rates and fast population 
growth, and only at a later stage followed by a decline in fertility rates 
with a more stable population size.
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Box 5�1 | IPAT and Kaya decomposition methods
The IPAT (Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971) and Kaya (Kaya, 1990) identi-
ties provide two common frameworks in the literature for analyzing 
emission drivers by decomposing overall changes in GHG emissions 
into underlying factors. The Kaya identity is a special case of the 
more general IPAT identity (Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971). The IPAT 
identity decomposes an impact (I, e. g., total GHG emissions) into 
population (P), affluence (A, e. g., income per capita) and technol-
ogy (T, e. g., GHG emission intensity of production or consumption). 
The Kaya identity deals with a subset of GHG emissions, namely 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, which is the dominant 
part of the anthropogenic GHG emissions and their changes at a 
global level (Figure 5.6). While global GHG emissions measured 
in GWP 100 have increased in all three categories, namely fossil 
energy CO2, AFOLU, and other over the last four decades, fossil 
energy CO2 dominates the absolute growth of GHG emissions in all 
regions and the world during the period. Two approaches to GHG 
accounting are distinguished in the literature, namely territorial and 
consumption accounts (see Box 5.2 for the definition). The Kaya 
identity for territorial CO2 emissions can be written as: 
(1) Territorial C O 2  emissions =
 population ×  GDP ___ 
population
×  
Energy
 __
$GDP
 ×  
C O 2  emission ____
Energy
 
In other words, CO2 emissions are expressed as a product of 
four underlying factors: (1) population, (2) per capita GDP 
(GDP / population), (3) energy intensity of GDP (Energy / GDP), 
and (4) CO2 intensity of energy (CO2 emissions / energy) (Raupach 
et al., 2007; Steckel et al., 2011). Also even simpler decomposi-
tion forms can be found in the literature (Raupach et al., 2007). 
They are obtained when any two or three adjoining factors in the 
four-factor Kaya identity in equation (1) are merged. For example, 
merging energy intensity of GDP and CO2 intensity of energy into 
CO2 intensity of GDP, a three-factor decomposition can be written 
as:
(2) Territorial C O 2  emissions = 
 population ×  GDP ___ 
population
×  
C O 2  emission ____
GDP
 
Similarly, consumption-based CO2 emissions can be decomposed 
such that
(3) Consumption − based C O 2 emissions =
 population ×  GNE ___ 
population
×  
consumption − based C O 2  emission   _________ 
GNE
 
In this case, consumption-based CO2 emissions are decomposed 
into (1) population, (2) per capita consumption (GNE / popula-
tion; GNE = Gross National Expenditure), and (3) embodied CO2 
intensity of consumption (consumption-based CO2 emission / GNE). 
The Kaya identity can also be expressed as a ratio between two 
time periods to show relative change in CO2 emissions and its 
contributing factors (Raupach et al., 2007).
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Each person added to the global population increases GHG emis-
sions, but the additional contribution varies widely depending on the 
socio-economic and geographic conditions of the additional person. 
There is a 91-fold difference in per capita CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuels between the highest and lowest emitters across the nine global 
regions analyzed by Raupach et al. (2007). Global CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion have been growing at about the growth rate 
of global population in most of the 1970 – 2010 period, but emissions 
growth accelerated toward the end of the period (Figure 5.7). 
Aggregating population and GHG emissions data according to the five 
IPCC Representative Concentration Pathways (RC) regions (see Annex 
II.2), Figure 5.11 shows that between 1971 and 2010 population growth 
was fastest in the MAF; GHG emissions have increased most in ASIA 
while changes in population and emissions were modest in OECD-1990 
and EIT. The evolution of total population and per capita GHG emissions 
in the same period is shown in Figure 5.11. With some fluctuations, per 
capita emissions have declined slightly from rather high levels in the 
OECD-1990 countries and the EIT, decreased somewhat from relatively 
lower levels in LAM and especially in the MAF, while more than doubled 
in ASIA. These trends raise concerns about the future: per capita emis-
sions decline slowly in high-emission regions (OECD-1990 and EIT) 
while fast increasing per capita emissions are combined with relatively 
fast population and per capita income growth in ASIA (JRC / PBL, 2013).
There is a substantial number of empirical econometric studies that 
assess the role of various demographic attributes; an early example is 
(Dietz and Rosa, 1997). Those reviewed by O’Neill et al. (2012) confirm 
earlier observations that GHG emissions increase with the population 
size, although the elasticity values (percent increase in emissions per 
1 % increase in population size) vary widely: from 0.32 (Martínez-Zar-
zoso and Maruotti, 2011) to 2.78 (Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2007) (for 
the eight new European Union countries of Central Europe). Differences 
in statistical estimation techniques and data sets (countries included, 
time horizon covered, the number and kind of variables included in 
the regression model and their possible linkages to excluded variables) 
explain this wide range. Most recent studies find more than propor-
tional increase of emissions triggered by the increase in population. Yet 
the literature presents contradicting results concerning whether popu-
lation growth in rich or poor countries contributes more to increasing 
GHG emissions: Poumanyvong and Kaneko (2010) estimate elasticities 
ranging from 1.12 (high-income) to 1.23 (middle-income) to 1.75 (low-
income) countries while Jorgenson and Clark (2010) find a value of 
1.65 for developed and 1.27 for developing groups of countries. 
5�3�2�2 Trends in demographic structure
Urbanization
Income, lifestyles, energy use (amount and mix), and the resulting GHG 
emissions differ considerably between rural and urban populations. The 
global rate of urbanization has increased from 13 % (1900) to 36 % 
(1970) to 52 % (2011), but the linkages between urbanization and 
GHG-emissions trends are complex and involve many factors includ-
ing the level of development, rate of economic growth, availability of 
energy resources and technologies, and urban form and infrastructure.
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Comparable direct measures of the effect of urbanization on emissions 
remain difficult due to challenges of defining consistent system bound-
aries, including administrative or territorial, functional or economic, 
and morphological or land use boundaries. Moreover, because urban 
areas are typically much smaller than the infrastructure (e. g., trans-
port, energy) in which they are embedded, strict territorial emissions 
accounting such as that used for nations, omits important emissions 
sources such as from energy production (Chavez and Ramaswami, 
2013). An alternative is to measure the effect of urbanization indirectly, 
through statistical analysis of national emission data and its relation 
to national urbanization trends. An analysis of the effects of urbaniza-
tion on energy use and CO2 emissions over the period 1975 – 2005 for 
99 countries, divided into three groups based on GDP per capita, and 
explicitly considering the shares of industry and services and the energy 
intensity in the CO2 emissions, concludes that the effects depend on 
the stage of development. The impact of urbanization on energy use is 
negative (elasticity of – 0.132) in the low-income group, while positive 
(0.507) in the medium-income group, and strongly positive (0.907) in 
the high-income group. Emissions (for given energy use) are positively 
affected in all three income groups (between 0.358 and 0.512) (Pou-
manyvong and Kaneko, 2010). Consistent with this conclusion, a set of 
multivariate decomposition studies reviewed by O’Neill et  al. (2012) 
estimate elasticity values between 0.02 and 0.76, indicating almost 
negligible to significant but still less than proportional increases in 
GHG emissions as a result of urbanization. In China, between 1992 
and 2007, urbanization and the related lifestyle changes contributed 
to increasing energy-related CO2 emissions (Minx et al., 2011).
Many studies observe that GHG emissions from urban regions vary 
significantly between cities, but that measurements are also widely 
dispersed due to differences in accounting methods, the coverage of 
GHGs and their sources, and the definition of urban areas (Dhakal, 
2009). A comparison of GHG emissions in 10 global cities by consid-
ering geophysical characteristics (climate, resources, gateway status 
(port of entry and distribution centre for larger regions due to its geo-
graphic location), and technical features (urban design, electricity gen-
eration, waste processing) finds various outstanding determinants. For 
example, the level of household income is important because it affects 
the threshold temperature for heating and cooling of the residential 
area. The use of high versus low-carbon sources for electricity pro-
duction, such as nuclear power, is an important determinant of urban 
GHG emissions in several global cities in the examined sample. Other 
determinants include connectivity, accessibility of destination and ori-
gin, and ability to use alternative transportation modes including mass 
transit, bicycling, or walking. GHG emissions associated with aviation 
and marine fuels reflect the gateway status of cities that, in turn, is 
linked to the overall urban economic activity (Kennedy et al., 2009).
An extended analysis of the urbanization-emissions linkage in 88 
countries between 1975 and 2003 finds a diverse picture. In 44 coun-
tries, urbanization is found to be not a statistically significant con-
tributor to emissions. In the other 44 countries, all other things equal, 
in the early phase of urbanization (at low-urbanization levels) emis-
sions increased, while further urbanization at high-urbanization lev-
els was associated with decreasing emissions (Martínez-Zarzoso and 
Maruotti, 2011). This also confirms that in fast-growing and urban-
izing developing countries, urban households tend to be far ahead of 
rural households in the use of modern energy forms and use much 
larger shares of commercial energy. Urbanization thereby involves 
radical increases in household electricity demand and in CO2 emis-
sions as long as electricity supply comes from fossil fuelled, especially 
coal based power plants. Transition from coal to low-carbon electricity 
could mitigate the fast increasing CO2 emissions associated with the 
combination of fast urbanization and the related energy transition in 
these countries. 
The literature is divided about the contribution of urbanization to GHG 
emissions. Most top-down studies find increasing emissions as urban-
ization advances, while some studies identify an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the two. Bottom-up studies often identify eco-
nomic structure, trade typology, and urban form as central determi-
nants that are more important than the fraction of people in urban 
areas (see Chapter 12). These findings are important to consider when 
extrapolating past emission trends, based on past urbanization, to the 
future, together with other related aspects.
Age structure and household size
Studies of the effect of age structure (especially ageing) on GHG 
emissions fall into two main categories with seemingly contradicting 
results: overall macroeconomic studies, and household-level consump-
tion and energy use patterns of different age groups. A national-scale 
energy-economic growth model calculates for the United States that 
ageing tends to reduce long-term CO2 emissions significantly relative 
to a baseline path with equal population levels (Dalton et al., 2008). 
Lower labour force participation and labour productivity would slow 
economic growth in an ageing society, leading to lower energy con-
sumption and GHG emissions (O’Neill et al., 2010). In contrast, studies 
taking a closer look at the lifestyles and energy consumption of differ-
ent age groups find that older generations tend to use more energy 
and emit above average GHGs per person. A study of the impacts of 
population, incomes, and technology on CO2 emissions in the period 
1975 – 2000 in over 200 countries and territories finds that the share of 
the population in the 15 – 64 age group has a different impact on emis-
sions between different income groups: the impact is negative for high-
income countries and positive for lower-income levels (Fan et al., 2006). 
This is consistent with the finding that (in the United States) energy 
intensity associated with the lifestyles of the 20 – 34 and the above 65 
retirement-age cohorts tends to be higher than that of the 35 – 64 age 
group, largely explained by the fact that this middle-age cohort tends 
to live in larger households characterized by lower-energy intensity on 
a per person basis and that residential energy consumption and elec-
tricity consumption of the 65+ age group tends to be higher (Liddle 
and Lung, 2010). Similar results emerge for 14 ‘foundational’ European 
Union countries between 1960 and 2000: an increasing share of the 
65+ age group in the total population leads to increasing energy con-
sumption although the aggregated data disguise micro-level processes: 
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ageing may well influence the structure of production, consumption, 
transport, social services, and their location (York, 2007). Several stud-
ies assessed above indicate that part of the increasing emissions with 
age is due to the differences in household size. A five-country multi-
variate analysis of household energy requirement confirms this (Lenzen 
et al., 2006). Immigration is not explicitly considered in these studies, 
probably because it does not make much difference.
It remains an open question by how much the household-level effects of 
increasing CO2 emissions as a result of ageing population will counter-
balance the declining emissions as a result of slower economic growth 
caused by lower labour force participation and productivity. The balance 
is varied and depends on many circumstances. The most important is 
changes in labour participation: increasing retirement age in response 
to higher life expectancy will keep former retirement-age cohorts (60+) 
economically active, which means that the implications of ageing for 
incomes, lifestyles, energy use, and emissions are ‘postponed’ and the 
ratio of active / retired population changes less. Other important aspects 
include the macroeconomic structure, key export and import commodity 
groups, the direction and magnitude of financial transfers on the macro 
side, and on the health status, financial profile, and lifestyle choices and 
possibilities of the elderly at the household level. This makes it difficult 
to draw firm conclusions about the ageing-emissions linkages.
Despite the widely varying magnitudes and patterns of household 
energy use due to differences in geographical and technological char-
acteristics, lifestyles, and population density, most studies tend to indi-
cate that past trends of increasing age, smaller household size, and 
increasing urbanization were positive drivers for increasing energy use, 
and associated GHG emissions.
5�3�3 Economic growth and development
5�3�3�1 Production trends
This section reviews the role of income per capita as a driver of emis-
sions while reserving judgement on the appropriateness of GDP per 
capita as an indicator of development or welfare (see Kubiszewski 
et al., 2013). Global trends in per capita GDP and GHG emissions vary 
dramatically by region as shown in Figure 5.12. Economic growth was 
strongest in ASIA averaging 5.0 % per annum over the 1970 – 2010 
period. Economic growth averaged 1.9 % p. a. in the OECD-1990, but 
was below the global average of 1.8 % in the remaining regions. The 
MAF and the reforming economies saw setbacks in growth related to 
the changing price of oil and the collapse of the centrally planned 
economies, respectively. However, all regions showed a decline in 
emissions intensity over time. Emissions per capita grew in ASIA and 
were fairly constant in LAM, OECD-1990, and EIT, as well as globally, 
and declined in MAF. The levels of GDP and emissions per capita also 
vary tremendously globally as shown in Figure 5.12.
Per capita emissions are positively correlated with per capita income. 
But per capita emissions have declined in all regions but ASIA over 
time, so that there has been convergence in the level of per capita 
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Figure 5�12 | Regional trends in per capita production and GHG emissions (left panel), and for each region the four most populous countries in 2010 (right panel). Regions 
are defined in Annex II.2. Grey diagonals connect points with constant emission intensity (emissions / GDP). A shift to the right presents income growth. A flat or downwards line 
presents a decrease in energy intensity, 1971 and 2010. Right panel: The small labels refer to 1970, the large labels to 2010. The figure shows a clear shift to the right for some 
countries: increasing income at similar per capita emission levels. The figures also show the high income growth for Asia associated with substantial emissions increase. Data from 
JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012).
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emissions over time. Despite this convergence, there is still a wide 
variation in per capita emissions levels among countries at a common 
level of income per capita due to structural and institutional differ-
ences (Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2006; Matisoff, 2008; Stern, 2012).
The nature of the relationship between growth and the environ-
ment and identification of the causes of economic growth are both 
uncertain and controversial (Stern, 2011). The sources of growth are 
important because the degree to which economic growth is driven by 
technological change versus accumulation of capital and increased 
use of resources will strongly affect its impact on emissions. In par-
ticular, growth in developing countries might be expected to be more 
emissions-intensive than growth through innovation in technologically 
leading developed economies (Jakob et  al., 2012). However, despite 
this, energy use per capita is strongly linearly correlated with income 
per capita across countries (Krausmann et  al., 2008; see also Figure 
5.15). The short-run effects of growth are slightly different; it seems 
that energy intensity rises or declines more slowly in the early stages 
of business cycles, such as in the recovery from the global financial 
crisis in 2009 – 2010, and then declines more rapidly in the later stages 
of business cycles (Jotzo et al., 2012).
Mainstream economic theory (Aghion and Howitt, 2009), and empiri-
cal evidence (e. g., Caselli, 2005) point to technological change and 
increases in human capital per worker as the key underlying drivers 
of per capita economic output growth in the long run. Technologi-
cal change encompasses both quality improvements in products and 
efficiency improvements in production. Human capital is increased 
through improving workers’ skills through education and training. 
While mainstream growth and development economics does not allo-
cate much role for increasing energy and resource use as drivers of 
economic growth (Toman and Jemelkova, 2003), many researchers in 
energy and ecological economics do (Stern, 2011).
Productivity is lower in developing countries than developed coun-
tries (Caselli, 2005; Parente and Prescott, 2000). Developing countries 
can potentially grow faster than developed countries by adopting 
technologies developed elsewhere and ‘catch up’ to the productivity 
leaders (Parente and Prescott, 2000). Income per capita has risen in 
most countries of the world in the last several decades but there is 
much variation over time and regions, especially among low- and 
middle-income countries (Durlauf et  al., 2005). The highest growth 
rates are found for countries that are today at middle-income levels 
such as China and India (and before them Singapore, South Korea, 
etc.), which are in the process of converging to high-income levels. 
But many developing countries have not participated in convergence 
to the developed world and some have experienced negative growth 
in income per capita. Therefore, there is both convergence among 
some countries and divergence among others and a bi-modal distri-
bution of income globally (Durlauf et  al., 2005). A large literature 
attempts to identify why some countries succeed in achieving eco-
nomic growth and development and others not (Durlauf et al., 2005; 
Caselli, 2005; Eberhardt and Teal, 2011). But there seems to be little 
consensus as yet (Eberhardt and Teal, 2011). A very large number of 
variables could have an effect on growth performance and disentan-
gling their effects is statistically challenging because many of these 
variables are at least partially endogenous (Eberhardt and Teal, 2011). 
This incomplete understanding of the drivers of economic growth 
makes the development of future scenarios on income levels a diffi-
cult task. 
Ecological economists such as Ayres and Warr (2009) often ascribe to 
energy the central role in economic growth (Stern, 2011). Some eco-
nomic historians, such as Wrigley (2010), Allen (2009), and to some 
degree Pomeranz (2000), argue that limited availability of energy 
resources can constrain economic growth and that the relaxation of 
the constraints imposed by dependence of pre-industrial economies on 
biomass energy and muscle power sources alone, with the adoption of 
fossil energy was critical for the emergence of the Industrial Revolu-
tion in the 18th and 19th centuries. Stern and Kander (2012) develop 
a simple growth model including an energy input and econometri-
cally estimate it using 150 years of Swedish data. They find that since 
the beginning of the 19th century constraints imposed on economic 
growth by energy availability have declined as energy became more 
abundant, technological change improved energy efficiency, and the 
quality of fuels improved. A large literature has attempted using time 
series analysis to test whether energy use causes economic growth or 
vice versa, but results are significantly varied and no firm conclusions 
can be drawn yet (Stern, 2011). 
Figure 5�13 | Growth rates of per capita income and GHG emissions. The figure shows 
the correlation between the average annual growth rate of per capita income and per 
capita emissions from 1970 – 2010, for all countries with more than 1 million people by 
2010 | Points along the grey lines have either constant emissions intensity or emissions 
intensity declining at 2 %, 4 % or 6 % per annum. The size of the circles is proportional 
to countries’ emissions. The figure shows that fast growing economies also tend to 
have increasing emissions, while slower growing economies tend to have declining per 
capita emissions. This is despite quite rapidly declining emissions intensity in some fast 
growing economies (upper right corner). Regions are defined in Annex II.2 | Data from 
JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012).
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The effect of economic growth on emissions is another area of uncer-
tainty and controversy. The environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis pro-
poses that environmental impacts tend to first increase and then even-
tually decrease in the course of economic development (Grossman and 
Krueger, 1994). This theory has been very popular among economists but 
the econometric evidence has not been found to be very robust (Wag-
ner, 2008; Gallagher, 2009; Vollebergh et al., 2009; Stern, 2010) and in 
any case, even early studies found that carbon emissions continue to 
rise with increasing income (e. g., Shafik, 1994). More recent research 
(Brock and Taylor, 2010) has attempted to disentangle the effects of 
economic growth and technological change. Rapid catch-up growth in 
middle-income countries tends to overwhelm the effects of emissions-
reducing technological change resulting in strongly rising emissions. But 
in developed countries economic growth is slower and hence the effects 
of technological change are more apparent and emissions grow slower 
or decline. This narrative is illustrated by Figure 5.13. Almost all countries 
had declining emissions intensity over time but in more rapidly growing 
economies, this was insufficient to overcome the effect of the expansion 
of the economy. As a result, though there is much variation in the rate 
of decline of emissions intensity across countries, there is, in general, 
a strong positive correlation between the rates of growth of emissions 
and income per capita. The rapidly growing countries tend to be middle- 
and lower-income countries and hence there is a tendency for per capita 
emissions to grow in poorer countries and decline in wealthier ones 
(Brock and Taylor, 2010).
In conclusion, while economic growth increases the scale of the econ-
omy in the Kaya decomposition and, therefore, should increase emis-
sions, the technological change that is the main underlying driver of 
growth tends to reduce emissions. This has resulted in a tendency for 
slower growing or declining emissions per capita in wealthier, slower 
growing, economies, and global convergence in emissions per capita.
5�3�3�2 Consumption trends
Production and consumption are closely connected, but when we study 
their effect on GHG emissions, we find subtle but important differ-
ences. Box 5.2 presents two methods: one for allocating GHG emis-
sions to production (territories), and the other to consumption. 
Between 1990 and 2010, emissions from Annex B countries decreased 
by 8 % when taking a territorial perspective (production) to carbon 
accounting, while over the same period, emissions related to consump-
tion in Annex B increased by 5 % (Wiedmann et al., 2010; Peters et al., 
2011, 2012; Caldeira and Davis, 2011; Andrew et al, 2013). In a similar 
vein, as Figure 5.14 shows, while territorial emissions from non-OECD 
Asian countries together surpassed those of the OECD-1990 countries 
in 2009, for consumption-based emissions, the OECD countries as a 
group contributed more than all non-OECD Asian countries together 
for every year between 1990 and 2010. The difference between the 
two methods also shows up in the trends for the per capita emissions. 
The OECD-1990 territorial per capita emissions declined over 
1990 – 2010, while consumption-based emissions increased. By 2010, 
per capita territorial emissions for OCED countries are three times 
those for non-OECD Asian countries, but per capita consumption-
related emissions differ by a factor of five. The overall picture shows a 
Box 5�2 | Definitions of territorial and consumption-based emissions
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) requires countries to submit, following the IPCC 
guidelines, annual National GHG Emissions Inventories to assess 
the progress made by individual countries on GHG emissions and 
removals taking place within national (including administered) 
territories and offshore areas over which the country has jurisdic-
tion (IPCC, 1997; House of Commons, 2012). These inventories are 
called ‘territorial-based emission inventories’.
Consumption-based emissions allocate emissions to the consum-
ers in each country, usually based on final consumption as in the 
System of National Accounting but also as trade-adjusted emis-
sions (Peters and Hertwich, 2008; DEFRA, 2012). Conceptually, 
consumption-based inventories can be thought of as consumption 
equals production minus emissions from the production of exports 
(see reviews by (Wiedmann et al., 2007; Wiedmann, 2009; Barrett 
et al., 2013). The methodology employed is predominately ‘Multi-
Regional Input-Output Analysis’ (MRIO). 
Note on Uncertainty – There is increased uncertainty in consump-
tion-based emission estimates. MRIO datasets combine data from 
different data sets, often large and incoherent. As a result, uncer-
tainties arise in relation to calibration, balancing, and harmonisa-
tion; use of different time periods; different currencies; different 
country classifications; levels of disaggregation, inflation, and raw 
data errors (Lenzen et al., 2004, 2010; Peters, 2007; Weber and 
Matthews, 2008; Peters et al., 2012). Production-based emissions 
data are a key input to the MRIO models that can vary for some 
countries significantly between databases (Peters et al., 2012). 
A process of harmonization can greatly reduce the necessary 
manipulations, and hence, uncertainties reflected in inconsistent 
reporting practices in different countries and regions (Peters and 
Solli, 2010; House of Commons, 2012; Barrett et al., 2013). For a 
detailed description in the variation of MRIO models, please read 
Peters et al.(2012). Peters et al (2012) concludes that estimates 
from different studies are robust and that the variation between 
estimates relates to different input data and approaches to assign 
emissions to trade and not uncertainty.
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substantial gap between territorial and consumption-based emissions, 
due to emissions embedded in trade. For the OECD-1990 countries, the 
gap amounts to 2.6 GtCO2 in 2010. The data shows that the reduction 
in territorial emissions that has been achieved in the OECD-1990 coun-
tries has been more than negated by an increase in emissions in other 
countries, but related with consumption in OECD-1990 countries. Fur-
thermore, while countries with a Kyoto Protocol commitment did 
reduce emissions over the accounting period by 7 %, their share of 
imported over domestic emissions increased by 14 % (Peters et  al., 
2011; Aichele and Felbermayr, 2012).
Numerous studies have used a structural decomposition analysis to 
quantify the factors for changes in GHG emissions over time in both 
developed and developing countries (De Haan, 2001; Peters et  al., 
2007; Baiocchi and Minx, 2010; Wood, 2009; Weber, 2009). The analy-
sis has been used to separate factors such as the intensity per output, 
shifts in production structure, as well as changes in the composition 
and the level of consumption. In all of these studies, increasing levels 
of consumption is the main contributor to increasing emissions. Specif-
ically, all the studies show that reductions in emissions resulting from 
improvements in emissions intensity and changes in the structure of 
production and consumption have been offset by significant increases 
in emissions, resulting from the volume of consumption, resulting in 
an overall increase in emissions (De Haan, 2001; Peters et al., 2007; 
Baiocchi and Minx, 2010). For example, De Haan (2001) demonstrates 
for the Netherlands that final demand increased by 31 % over 11 years 
(1987 – 1998), Peters et  al. (2007) demonstrate an increase of con-
sumption by 129 % over 10 years for China, and Baiocchi and Minx 
(2010) show for the United Kingdom that final demand increased by 
49 % between 1992 and 2004. In all these cases, the increase in final 
demand was greater than the emission reduction caused by structural 
change and efficiency improvements, leading to an overall increase in 
consumption-related emissions.
Calculating emissions based on a consumption-based approach 
sketches a more negative view on the decoupling of economic growth 
from greenhouse gas emissions. According to York (2007), territorial 
emissions showed a relative decoupling; emissions grew by 0.73 % for 
every 1 % increase in GDP per capita from 1960 – 2008. However, the 
elasticity of consumption-based emissions with respect to economic 
Figure 5�14 | Territory-based versus consumption-based CO2 emissions in five world regions, from 1990 to 2010 | The left panel presents total emissions, while the right panel 
presents per capita emissions. The blue areas indicate that a region is a net importer of embodied CO2 emissions. The yellow area indicates a region is a net exporter of embodied 
CO2 | Data from Lenzen et al. (2010). Regions are defined in Annex II.2.
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growth will have to be revised upwards for OECD-1990 countries, 
given that their consumption emissions grew at a faster rate than ter-
ritorial ones (Peters et al., 2011). In this sense, there is less decoupling 
in industrialized nations.
5�3�3�3 Structural change
Changes in the structure of the economy — shares of each economic or 
industry sector in the output of the economy — might also affect emis-
sions. Over the course of economic development, as income grows, 
the share of agriculture in the value of production and employment 
tends to decline and the share of services increases (Syrquin and Chen-
ery, 1989). The share of manufacturing tends to follow an inverted 
U-shaped path (Hettige et al., 2000). The income levels at which these 
transitions occur differ across countries. For example, China’s share 
of services in GDP and employment is small and its agriculture share 
large, given its income level (World Bank, 2011), while India has a rela-
tively large service sector (Deb Pal et  al., 2012). Between 1970 and 
2010 the global share of agriculture in GDP has declined from 9 % to 
3 % while the share of services increased from 53 % to 71 %. Industry 
declined from 38 % to 26 % of GDP (World Bank, 2011). Schäfer (2005) 
shows that there are similar changes in the sectoral composition of 
energy use. The share of total energy use used in services increases in 
the course of economic development while that of industry follows an 
inverted U-shaped curve. The share of residential energy use declines 
with rising per capita income.
The shift from the industrial sector to services reduces energy use 
and emissions less than commonly thought. Partly, this is due to 
strong gains in productivity in manufacturing. The productivity gain 
can be observed through the price of manufactured goods, which 
has historically fallen relative to the price of services. Because of the 
price decline, it appears that the share of manufacturing industry 
in the economy is falling when, in real output terms, it is constant 
or increasing (Kander, 2005). Part of the productivity gain in manu-
facturing is due to improvements in energy efficiency, which reduce 
energy intensity in the sector (Kander, 2005). Also, not all service sec-
tors are low in energy intensity. Transport is clearly energy-intensive 
and retail and other service sectors depend on energy-intensive infra-
structure. 
In Austria and the United Kingdom, the transition of the industrial 
society into a service economy or post-industrial society did not lead 
to dematerialization (Krausmann et  al., 2008), but instead it was 
systematically linked to an increase in per capita energy and mate-
rial consumption as all parts of the economy shifted from traditional 
to modern methods of production. Further evidence (Henriques and 
Kander, 2010) for 10 developed countries (United States, Japan, and 
eight European countries), and three emerging economies (India, 
Brazil, and Mexico), indicates a minor role for structural change in 
reducing energy intensity, while the decline in energy intensity within 
industries is found to be the main driver of aggregate energy inten-
sity. Yet the decomposition is sensitive to the level of disaggregation. 
A classic result in the growth-accounting literature (Jorgenson and 
Griliches, 1967) is that a finer disaggregation of inputs and outputs 
leads to lower estimates for technological change and a larger role for 
substitution between inputs and structural change. This is confirmed 
by Wing (2008), who found that structural change between industries 
explained most of the decline in energy intensity in the United States 
(1958 – 2000), especially before 1980 (Stern, 2011). An alternative per-
spective is provided by the literature on consumption-based emissions 
(see Section  5.3.3.2). Baiocchi and Minx (2010) show that the shift 
to a service economy in the United Kingdom was partly achieved by 
off-shoring emissions-intensive industrial activities and thus reducing 
industrial activity, and that the service sector uses imported emissions-
intensive goods. Both of these offset the reduction in emissions from 
shifting toward the service sector in the United Kingdom. Likewise, Suh 
(2006) and Nansai et al. (2009b) show that if the entire supply chain 
is considered, the emissions intensity of services is much higher than if 
only the final production of services is considered.
The reform of centrally planned economies has been an important 
factor driving changes in GHG emissions. Emissions and energy inten-
sity were high in China, the former Soviet Union, and many Eastern 
European countries prior to reform, and declined as their economies 
were reformed. China serves as a case in point. Its energy intensity 
was very high compared to similar but market-oriented countries 
before 1980, but China’s energy intensity decreased sharply between 
1980 and 2000, as it opened its economy through market-based 
reforms (Ma and Stern, 2008). Energy and emissions intensity rose 
and then fell again from 2000 to the present as at first easy options 
for energy efficiency improvements were exhausted and later new 
policies to improve energy and carbon intensity were put in place. 
On the other hand, China’s carbon intensity of energy supply has 
increased steadily since at least 1970 (Stern and Jotzo, 2010). Sec-
toral shifts played only a small role in these large movements of the 
past three decades (Ma and Stern, 2008; Steckel et al., 2011), though 
they were important in the rise in emissions intensity from 2000 to 
2005 (Minx et al., 2011).
In conclusion, the role of an increase in share of the service sector in 
output in reducing emissions is probably quite small, but finer-grained 
structural change could be important and economy-wide reforms con-
tribute much to the adoption of more energy- and emissions-efficient 
production processes.
5�3�4 Energy demand and supply
5�3�4�1 Energy demand
Globally, per capita primary energy use, as estimated by the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA) method (see Annex II.9), rose by 31 % 
from 1971 – 2010; however the five world regions exhibited two dif-
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ferent pathways during this period, as seen in Figure 5.15 (left). In the 
 OECD-1990 and EIT, energy use per capita rose by 13 – 14 %, while the 
other regions increased their per capita energy use at a much higher 
rate: LAM by 60 %, MAF by 90 %, and ASIA by 200 %. Nevertheless, 
the 2010 per capita energy use in these three regions still remains at 
less than half of the OECD-1990 and EIT countries 40 years ago.
The two pathways in per capita energy use are also reflected when 
looking at energy intensity over time (Figure 5.15 right). The measure-
ment of energy intensity, i. e., ratio of energy use per unit of GDP and 
its limitations, are discussed in the following section. The differences 
in pathways between the OECD-1990 and EIT versus ASIA, LAM, and 
MAF illustrate the energy intensity gap between the industrialized 
and developing countries. In Figure 5.16, we show a similar chart for 
individual countries. Combining the left and right panels, we see that 
improvements in energy intensity have slowed the growth in energy 
use substantially, but have been insufficient to offset the growth in the 
scale of the economy (Stern, 2012).
The effects of the oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979 and perhaps 2008 
(Hamilton, 2009) are particularly visible as dips in the OECD trend. 
These price shocks do not appear, however, to have reversed the 
upward trend in per capita primary energy use in the regions. In the 
long run, per capita energy consumption has increased with income 
and over time since the onset of the Industrial Revolution in Northern 
Europe (Gales et al., 2007) and the United States (Grübler, 2008; Tol 
et al., 2009) and since the Second World War in southern Europe (Gales 
et al., 2007). 
Changes in total energy use can be decomposed to reflect the effects 
of growth in population and income per capita and changes in energy 
intensity, all of which are discussed in detail in other sections of this 
chapter as well as in Chapter 7. 
The relationship between economic growth and energy use is com-
plicated and variable over time. The provision of energy services is 
one of the necessary conditions for economic growth, yet in turn, 
economic growth increases the demand for energy services (Grübler 
et al., 2012). As income increases, so does energy use. This phenom-
enon, coupled with population growth, has resulted in global total 
primary energy use increasing by 130 % between 1971 and 2010, 
and almost 50 times since 1800 (Nakicenovic et al., 1998; Grübler, 
2008). 
5�3�4�2 Energy efficiency and Intensity
Energy efficiency can be defined as the ratio of the desired (usable) 
energy output for a specific task or service to the energy input for 
the given energy conversion process (Nakicenovic et  al., 1996). For 
example, for an automobile engine, this is the mechanical energy at 
the crankshaft or the wheels divided by the energy input of gasoline. 
This definition of energy efficiency is called the first-law efficiency. 
Other approaches often define energy efficiency in relative terms, such 
as the ratio of minimum energy required by the current best prac-
tice technology to actual energy use, everything else being constant 
(Stern, 2012). 
Figure 5�15 | Historical trend (1971 – 2010) by region in per capita primary energy (left panel), and primary energy intensity of GDP (right panel), against GDP per capita on the 
horizontal axis. Grey diagonals connect points with constant energy intensity (left panel) and constant per capita primary energy use (right panel). Note that both axes are logarith-
mic. Source: IEA (2012); UN WPP (2012); World Bank (2012). Regions are defined in Annex II.2.
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In 2005, the global first-law efficiency of converting primary energy 
sources (such as coal or natural gas) to final energy forms (such as 
electricity or heat) was about 67 % (i. e., 330 EJ over 496 EJ). The effi-
ciency of further converting final energy forms into useful energy is 
lower, with an estimated global average of 51 % (i. e., 169 EJ over 330 
EJ). Thus, approximately one-third of global primary energy use is dis-
sipated to the environment in the form of waste heat or what is collo-
quially termed energy ‘losses’ (Grübler et al., 2012).
The theoretical potential for efficiency improvements is thus very large 
(Grübler et  al., 2012). However, efficiency improvements can lead to 
additional demand, a side-effect called the rebound effect, discussed 
later in Section 5.6.2, which needs to be taken into account (Pao and 
Tsai, 2010). 
Economic studies, including those based on the Kaya identity (Naki-
cenovic and Swart, 2000), often use energy intensity — the ratio of 
energy use per dollar of GDP — as an indicator of how effectively 
energy is used to produce goods and services, also known as its 
inverse: the energy productivity. However, energy intensity depends 
on many factors other than technical efficiencies, as discussed in the 
remainder of this section, and is not an appropriate proxy of actual 
energy (conversion) efficiency (Ang, 2006; Filippini and Hunt, 2011; 
Stern, 2012; Grübler et al., 2012).
Energy intensity metrics yield valuable insights into potentials for 
efficiency improvements related to various activities (Fisher and Naki-
cenovic, 2008; Grübler et al., 2012). Energy intensity measured at the 
economy-wide level is an attractive indicator because of its simplic-
ity and ease of comparability across systems and time (e. g., national 
economies, regions, cities, etc.). However, the indicator is affected by 
a number of issues, including in relation to the way definitions are 
made and measurements are performed (Ang, 2006; Filippini and Hunt, 
2011). Many factors besides technical efficiency drive energy intensity 
differences. 
Energy intensities are strongly affected by energy and economic 
accounting conventions, which are not always disclosed prominently in 
the reporting reference. For energy, the largest influences on the met-
rics are whether primary or final energy are used in the calculations, 
and whether or not non-commercial energy7 is included (Grübler et al., 
2012; see Figure 5.16).
Figure 5.16 illustrates these differences in the evolution of historical 
primary energy intensity for four major world economies: China, India, 
Japan, and the United States. It shows the different ways energy inten-
sity of GDP can be measured. 
To see how the inclusion of non-commercial energy affects energy 
intensity, we take the United States as an example, as its PPP and MER 
GDP are the same by definition. The thin green curve shows United 
States commercial energy intensity. According to Grübler et al. (2012), 
commercial energy intensities increase during the early phases of 
industrialization, as traditional, less-efficient energy forms are replaced 
by commercial energy. Once this substitution is completed, commer-
cial energy intensity peaks and starts to decline. This phenomenon is 
sometimes called the ‘hill of energy intensity’ (Grübler et  al., 2012). 
These peaks are observed to be lower for countries reaching this tran-
sition stage now, promising lower energy intensity in developing coun-
tries that still have to reach the peak (Gales et al., 2007; Lescaroux, 
2011; Reddy and Goldemberg, 1990; Nakicenovic et al., 1998). More 
important than this ‘hill’ in commercial energy intensities is, however, 
a pervasive trend toward overall lower total energy (including also 
non-commercial energy) intensities over time and across all countries 
(Grübler et  al., 2012). It is interesting to note that despite the rela-
tively wide upper and lower bounds of initial energy intensity among 
the investigated countries, they all exhibit very similar rates of energy 
7 Non-commercial energy is energy that is not commercially traded such as the 
traditional biomass or agricultural residues, which are of particular importance in 
developing countries.
Figure 5�16 | Energy intensity improvements and per capita GDP — USA (1800 – 2008), 
Japan (1885 – 2008), India (1950 – 2008), and China (1970 – 2008). Source: Grübler 
et al., 2012. Note: Energy intensities (in MJ per USD) are always shown for total primary 
energy (bold lines), and commercial primary energy only (thin lines), and per unit of GDP 
expressed at market exchange rates (MER in USD2005), and for China, India, and Japan 
also at purchasing power parities (PPP in Int$2005). For the United States, MER and PPP 
are identical.
1
10
100
100 1000 10,000 100,000
En
er
gy
 In
te
ns
it
y 
of
 G
D
P 
[M
J/
In
t$
20
05
 M
ER
 o
r 
PP
P]
GDP per Capita [Int$2005 MER or PPP]
USA Total USA Commercial
Japan Total MER Japan Commercial MER
Japan Total PPP Japan Commercial PPP
China Total MER China Commercial MER
China Total PPP China Commercial PPP
India Total MER India Commercial MER
India Total PPP India Commercial PPP
378
Drivers, Trends and Mitigation
5
Chapter 5
intensity improvements independent of whether they are on a more or 
less energy-intensive development trajectory.
The most important accounting factor is the exchange rate used for 
converting income measured in local national currencies to inter-
nationally comparable currency units based on either MER or PPP 
exchange rates (both illustrated in Figure 5.16) (Grübler et al., 2012). 
In the cases of India and China, MER energy intensities are very high, 
similar to the energy intensities of the industrialized countries more 
than 100 years ago. This gives the appearance of very high energy 
intensity of GDP in developing countries. However, China and India’s 
PPP-measured GDPs are much higher, meaning that with the same dol-
lar amount, a Chinese or Indian consumer can purchase more goods 
and services in developing countries than in industrialized countries. 
The PPP-measured energy intensities are thus much lower for devel-
oping countries, indicating substantially higher energy effectiveness in 
these countries than would be calculated using MER (Grübler et  al., 
2012). A further limitation of GDP accounting, especially for develop-
ing countries, is the exclusion of ‘grey economies’ in official statistics, 
which would increase GDP.
Countries with long-term statistical records show improvements in 
total energy intensities by a factor of five or more since 1800, corre-
sponding to an global annual average decline of total energy intensi-
ties of about 0.75 – 1 % (Gilli et al., 1990; Fouquet, 2008). Improvement 
rates can be much faster over periods of a few decades, as illustrated 
in the case of China, which exhibited a steep decline (2 – 3 % / year for 
PPP- and MER-based energy intensities, respectively) between 1979 
and 2000 before the trend flattened (Stern and Jotzo, 2010). Faster 
economic growth leads to a faster turnover of the capital stock of an 
economy, thus offering more opportunities to switch to more energy-
efficient technologies. The reverse also applies for the economies in 
transition (Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s) 
or recession; that is, with declining GDP, energy intensities increase.
Energy intensity has declined globally in all developed and major 
developing countries including India and China (Steckel et al., 2011). 
When traditional (non-commercial) biomass fuels are included in the 
measure of energy input, energy intensity has declined over time in 
most investigated countries (Gales et  al., 2007). However, historical 
improvements in energy intensities have not been sufficient to fully 
offset GDP growth, resulting in increased energy consumption over 
time (Bruckner et al., 2010). The literature indicates some albeit incon-
sistent convergence in energy intensities among developed economies, 
but not for both developed and developing countries (Le Pen and Sévi, 
2010; Mulder and de Groot, 2012).
Changes in energy intensity over time can be decomposed into the 
effects of structural change (the shift to more or less energy-inten-
sive industries), changes in the mix of energy sources, technological 
change, and the quantities of other inputs such as capital and labour 
used (Stern, 2012; Wang, 2011). Globally, structural changes play a 
smaller role in determining trends in energy use and CO2 emissions, 
though they can be important in individual countries (Cian et  al., 
2013). More generally for countries and regions, energy intensity is 
also affected by the substitution of capital and other inputs for energy 
(Stern, 2012). The drivers of energy intensity trends are difficult to 
isolate. For example, in the United States, most researchers find that 
technological change has been the dominant factor in reducing energy 
intensity (Metcalf, 2008). Similar results have been found for Sweden 
(Kander, 2005) and China (Ma and Stern, 2008; Steckel et al., 2011). 
However, Wing (2008) finds that structural change explained most of 
the decline in energy intensity in the United States (1958 – 2000), espe-
cially before 1980, and Kaufmann (2004) attributes the greatest part 
of the decline to substitution towards higher-quality energy sources, 
in particular electricity that produces more output per Joule. Similarly, 
Liao et al. (2007) conclude that structural change, instead of techno-
logical change, is the most dominant factor in reducing energy inten-
sity in China.
Some differences in energy intensity among countries are easily 
explained. Countries with cold winters and formerly centrally planned 
economies tend to be more energy-intensive economies, though the 
latter have improved energy intensities significantly in recent decades 
through reform of energy markets (Stern, 2012). The role of economic 
structure, resource endowments, and policies explain much of the dif-
ferences in energy intensities (Ramachandra et  al., 2006; Matisoff, 
2008; Wei et  al., 2009; Stern, 2012; Davidsdottir and Fisher, 2011). 
There is no clear one-to-one link between overall energy intensity and 
energy efficiency in production (Filippini and Hunt, 2011), though there 
is evidence for the role of energy prices. Higher energy prices are asso-
ciated with lower levels of energy consumption and are significantly 
determined by policy. Countries that have high electricity prices tend 
to have lower demand for electricity, and vice-versa (Platchkov and 
Pollitt, 2011), with a price elasticity of demand for total energy use 
between – 0.2 and – 0.45 for the OECD countries between 1978 and 
2006 (Filippini and Hunt, 2011).
5�3�4�3 Carbon-intensity, the energy mix, and resource 
availability
Carbon intensity is calculated as the ratio of emissions of CO2 per unit 
of primary or final energy, whereas decarbonization refers to the rate 
at which the carbon intensity of energy decreases. Throughout the 20th 
century, the choice of fossil-fuels for energy has progressed towards 
less carbon intensive fuels and to conversion of energy to more usable 
forms (e. g., electricity) (Grübler et  al., 2012). Hydrogen-rich fuels 
release, during combustion, more energy for every carbon atom that is 
oxidized to CO2 (Grübler et al., 1999). The result is a shift from fuels 
such as coal with a high-carbon content to energy carriers with a 
lower-carbon content such as natural gas8, as well as the introduction 
of near-zero carbon energy sources, such as renewables, including sus-
8 For further detailed information on carbon emissions for various combustible fuels, 
see IPCC (1997) and IPCC (2006).
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tainably managed biomass (biogenic carbon is reabsorbed through 
new growth), and nuclear, and consequently further decarbonization of 
energy systems (Grübler and Nakićenović, 1996; Grübler, 2008). Decar-
bonization can also affect the emissions of other GHGs and radiatively 
active substances such as aerosols. Figure 5.17 (left panel) shows the 
historical dynamics of primary energy. It indicates that the changes in 
primary energy are very slow, because it took more than half a century 
to replace coal as the dominant source of energy.
Figure 5.17 (right panel) illustrates the historical trend of global 
decarbonization of primary energy since 1850 in terms of the aver-
age carbon emissions per unit of primary energy (considering all pri-
mary energy sources, commercial energy sources with and without 
biomass). Historically, traditional biomass emissions related to LUCs, 
i. e., from deforestation to land for food and energy crops, have far 
exceeded carbon releases from energy-related biomass burning, which 
indicates that in the past, biomass, like fossil fuels, has also contrib-
uted significantly to increases in atmospheric concentrations of CO2 
(Grübler et al., 2012).
The global rate of decarbonization has been on average about 0.3 % 
annually, about six times too low to offset the increase in global 
energy use of approximately 2 % annually (Grübler et al., 2012). A sig-
nificant slowing of decarbonization trends since the energy crises of 
the 1970s is noteworthy, particularly the rising carbon intensities as a 
result of increased use of coal starting in 2000 (IEA, 2009; Stern and 
Jotzo, 2010; Steckel et  al., 2011). Recent increases in natural gas, in 
particular shale gas use, will tend to partially offset the carbonization 
trends.
Some future scenarios foresee continuing decarbonization over the 
next several decades as natural gas and non-fossil energy sources 
increase their share in total primary energy use. Other scenarios antici-
pate a reversal of decarbonization in the long term as more easily 
accessible sources of conventional oil and gas are replaced by more 
carbon-intensive alternatives such as coal and unconventional oil and 
gas (Fisher et al., 2007). Nonetheless, almost all scenarios anticipate an 
increase in future demand for energy services. The increase in energy 
demand means higher primary energy requirements and, depending on 
the rates of future energy-efficiency improvements, higher emissions. 
Therefore, energy-efficiency improvements alone will not be sufficient 
to significantly reduce GHG emissions, and it is thus essential to accel-
erate the worldwide rate of decarbonization. Current evidence indi-
cates that further decarbonization will not be primarily driven by the 
exhaustion of fossil fuels, but rather by economics, technological and 
scientific advances, socio-political decisions, and other salient driving 
forces. Furthermore, new information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) can help reduce the energy needs and associated emissions to 
improve the efficiency measures as a result of better management of 
energy generation and end-use, e. g., emergence of smart grids and 
better control of end-use devices. 
Fossil fuel reserves and resources make up the hydrocarbon endow-
ments, which as a whole are not known with a high degree of cer-
tainty. Reserves are the part of global fossil occurrences that are 
known with high certainty and can be extracted using current tech-
nologies at prevailing prices. Thus, the quantification and classification 
of reserves relies on the dynamic balance between geological assur-
ance, technological possibilities, and economic feasibility. There is little 
controversy that oil and gas occurrences are abundant, whereas the 
reserves are more limited, with some 50 years of production for oil 
and about 70 years for natural gas at the current rates of extraction 
(Rogner et al., 2012). Reserve additions have shifted to inherently more 
challenging and potentially costlier locations, with technological prog-
ress outbalancing potentially diminishing returns (Nakicenovic et  al., 
1998; Rogner et al., 2012).
Figure 5�17 | Left Panel: Structural change in world primary energy (in percent) over 1850 – 2008 illustrating the substitution of traditional biomass (mostly non-commercial) by 
coal and later by oil and gas. The emergence of hydro, nuclear and new renewables is also shown. Source: Nakicenovic et al. (1998) and Grübler (2008). Right panel: Decarboniza-
tion of primary energy (PE) use worldwide over 1850 – 2008 (kg of CO2 emitted per GJ). The black line shows carbon intensities of all primary energy sources, orange line of com-
mercial energy sources without biomass CO2 emissions, assuming they have all been taken up by the biosphere under a sustainable harvesting regime (biomass re-growth absorbing 
the CO2 released from biomass burning) and the green line shows global decarbonization without biomass and its CO2 emissions. Note: For comparison, the specific emission 
factors (OECD / IPCC default emission factors, lower-heating value (LHV) basis) for biomass (wood fuel), coal, crude oil, and natural gas are also shown (coloured squares). Source: 
updated from Grübler et al. (2012).
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In general, estimates of the resources of unconventional gas, oil, 
and coal are huge (GEA, 2012; Rogner et al., 2012) ranging for oil 
resources to be up to 20,000 EJ or almost 120 times larger than cur-
rent global production; natural gas up to 120,000 EJ or 1300 times 
current production, whereas coal resources might be as large as 
400,000 EJ or 3500 times larger than current production. However, 
global resources are unevenly distributed and are concentrated in 
some regions and not others (U. S. Energy Information Administra-
tion, 2010). These upper estimates of global hydrocarbon endow-
ments indicate that their ultimate depletion cannot be the relied 
upon to limit global CO2 emissions. For example, the carbon embed-
ded in oil and gas reserves exceeds the current carbon content of the 
atmosphere. The emissions budget for stabilizing climate change at 
2 °C above pre-industrial levels is about the same as the current car-
bon content of the atmosphere, meaning that under this constraint 
only a small fraction of reserves can be exploited (Meinshausen 
et al., 2009). Chapter 7 of this report discusses in detail the current 
and future availability of global energy resources (see also Table 
7.2).
5�3�5 Other key sectors
This section briefly describes GHG emission trends for the other main 
economic sectors (transport, buildings, industry, AFOLU, and waste) 
and the correlation between emissions and income, showing marked 
differences between sectors and countries. The following sections pro-
vide short discussions of trends and drivers by sector, while the follow-
ing chapters (7 – 11) provide detailed analyses. Note that in Chapter 
5, we consider only direct emissions for the buildings sector, whereas 
Chapter 9 also includes indirect emissions.
GHG emissions grew in all sectors, except in AFOLU where positive 
and negative emission changes are reported across different data-
bases and uncertainties in the data are high (see Section 11.2). As is 
clear from Figure 5.18, high-income countries contribute mostly to 
emissions associated with transport (Chapter 8) and buildings 
(Chapter 9). Low and lower middle-income countries contribute the 
largest share of emissions associated with AFOLU (Chapter 11). 
Between 2000 and 2010, emissions by upper middle-income coun-
tries from energy (+3.5 GtCO2e / yr) and industry (+2.4 GtCO2e / yr) 
more than doubled, and by 2010, emissions from industry in upper 
middle-income countries have passed those from high-income coun-
tries.
The large increase in energy and industry emissions in upper middle-
income countries is consistent with the observed income growth and 
the correlation between emissions and income for these sectors (Fig-
ure 5.19). There is a robust positive relation between income and emis-
sions, particularly for annual income levels between 1000 and 10,000 
Int$2005 / cap, while for transport, the correlation between income and 
emissions continues into higher-income levels. We find no positive cor-
relation between income and emissions for AFOLU.
In 2010, the typical high-income country (median of the high-
income group, population-weighted) had per capita emissions of 13 
tCO2e q/ cap yr, while per capita emissions in the typical low-income 
country were only about one-tenth of that value, at 1.4 tCO2eq / cap yr. 
But, there is a large variation among countries that have similar 
income levels. The per capita emissions in high-income countries range 
from 8.2 to 21 tCO2eq / cap yr, for the (population weighted) 10 and 90 
percentile, respectively. Many low-income countries (median income 
of 1,200 Int$2005 / cap) have low per capita emissions (median of 1.4 
tCO2eq / yr), but for the low-income country group, average per capita 
emissions (4.3 tCO2e q/ yr) are pulled up by a few countries with very 
high emissions associated with land-use.
5�3�5�1 Transport
Global transport GHG emissions9 grew from 2.8 GtCO2eq in 1970 to 
7 GtCO2eq in 2010 (JRC / PBL, 2013). The OECD-1990 countries con-
tributed the largest share of the emissions (i. e., 60 % in 1970, 56 % 
in 1990, and 46 % in 2010) but the highest growth rates in transport 
emissions were in the upper middle-income countries and interna-
tional bunkers. The overall picture shows that transport emissions have 
steadily increased but show a marked decrease around 2008 / 2009. 
Increasing demand for passenger and freight transport, urban develop-
ment and sprawl, lack of rail and bus transit and cycle infrastructure in 
many regions, transport behaviour constrained by lack of modal choice 
in some regions, a high fuel-consuming stock of vehicles, relatively low 
oil prices, and the limited availability of low-carbon fuels have been the 
principal drivers of transport sector CO2 emission growth over the past 
few decades (Jolley, 2004; Davies et al., 2007; IPCC, 2007; Timilsina and 
Shrestha, 2009; Ubaidillah, 2011; Wang et al., 2011 Chapter 8).
The marked growth rate of international transport emissions after 
2002 coincides with growth in Chinese exporting industries sugges 
3ting an influence of trade policies and world trade agreements on 
transport emissions (Olivier et al., 2011). 
The high oil prices of 2008 and the global recession in 2009 both 
resulted in a decrease in fossil fuel consumption for the OECD coun-
tries, with CO2 emissions declining by 2.0 % in 2008, and an esti-
mated 6.3 % in 2009. GHG emissions in non-OECD countries were not 
affected (US EIA, 2011).
There is a strong correlation between per capita transport emissions 
and per capita incomes and alignment of the two variables is sharper 
in the high-income countries (Figure 5.19) as the demand for personal 
transportation increases as standards of living rise and economic activ-
ity increases (US EIA, 2011). 
9 Consisting of direct  CO 2 ,  CH 4 ,  N 2 O, and F-gases (Freight Vision, 2009).
Figure 5�18 | Regional and sector distribution of GHG emission trends. Regions are defined in Annex II.2 | The figure shows annual GHG emissions for the six key sectors discussed 
in Sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5 | The left-lower panel presents global sector emissions to assess the relative contribution. Decadal growth rates are projected on the charts for emissions 
exceeding 0.2 GtCO2eq / yr. The direct emission data from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012) (see Annex II.9) represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay 
that approximate to CO2 flux from anthopogenic emission sources in the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) sub-sector. For a more detailed representation of Agriculture and FOLU 
(AFOLU) GHG flux see Section 11.2 and Figures 11.2 and 11.6.
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In general, estimates of the resources of unconventional gas, oil, 
and coal are huge (GEA, 2012; Rogner et al., 2012) ranging for oil 
resources to be up to 20,000 EJ or almost 120 times larger than cur-
rent global production; natural gas up to 120,000 EJ or 1300 times 
current production, whereas coal resources might be as large as 
400,000 EJ or 3500 times larger than current production. However, 
global resources are unevenly distributed and are concentrated in 
some regions and not others (U. S. Energy Information Administra-
tion, 2010). These upper estimates of global hydrocarbon endow-
ments indicate that their ultimate depletion cannot be the relied 
upon to limit global CO2 emissions. For example, the carbon embed-
ded in oil and gas reserves exceeds the current carbon content of the 
atmosphere. The emissions budget for stabilizing climate change at 
2 °C above pre-industrial levels is about the same as the current car-
bon content of the atmosphere, meaning that under this constraint 
only a small fraction of reserves can be exploited (Meinshausen 
et al., 2009). Chapter 7 of this report discusses in detail the current 
and future availability of global energy resources (see also Table 
7.2).
5�3�5 Other key sectors
This section briefly describes GHG emission trends for the other main 
economic sectors (transport, buildings, industry, AFOLU, and waste) 
and the correlation between emissions and income, showing marked 
differences between sectors and countries. The following sections pro-
vide short discussions of trends and drivers by sector, while the follow-
ing chapters (7 – 11) provide detailed analyses. Note that in Chapter 
5, we consider only direct emissions for the buildings sector, whereas 
Chapter 9 also includes indirect emissions.
GHG emissions grew in all sectors, except in AFOLU where positive 
and negative emission changes are reported across different data-
bases and uncertainties in the data are high (see Section 11.2). As is 
clear from Figure 5.18, high-income countries contribute mostly to 
emissions associated with transport (Chapter 8) and buildings 
(Chapter 9). Low and lower middle-income countries contribute the 
largest share of emissions associated with AFOLU (Chapter 11). 
Between 2000 and 2010, emissions by upper middle-income coun-
tries from energy (+3.5 GtCO2e / yr) and industry (+2.4 GtCO2e / yr) 
more than doubled, and by 2010, emissions from industry in upper 
middle-income countries have passed those from high-income coun-
tries.
The large increase in energy and industry emissions in upper middle-
income countries is consistent with the observed income growth and 
the correlation between emissions and income for these sectors (Fig-
ure 5.19). There is a robust positive relation between income and emis-
sions, particularly for annual income levels between 1000 and 10,000 
Int$2005 / cap, while for transport, the correlation between income and 
emissions continues into higher-income levels. We find no positive cor-
relation between income and emissions for AFOLU.
Figure 5�18 | Regional and sector distribution of GHG emission trends. Regions are defined in Annex II.2 | The figure shows annual GHG emissions for the six key sectors discussed 
in Sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5 | The left-lower panel presents global sector emissions to assess the relative contribution. Decadal growth rates are projected on the charts for emissions 
exceeding 0.2 GtCO2eq / yr. The direct emission data from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012) (see Annex II.9) represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay 
that approximate to CO2 flux from anthopogenic emission sources in the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) sub-sector. For a more detailed representation of Agriculture and FOLU 
(AFOLU) GHG flux see Section 11.2 and Figures 11.2 and 11.6.
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5�3�5�2 Buildings
Building sector emissions grew from 2.5 GtCO2eq in 1970 to 
3.2 GtCO2eq in 2010 with emissions growth rates in OECD-1990 coun-
tries being largely negative. Positive-emission growth rates were reg-
istered in the upper and lower middle-income countries, although the 
largest contribution to buildings emissions still came from OECD-1990 
countries (Figure 5.18).
Per capita buildings emissions and per capita income are positively 
correlated. Considering a life-cycle assessment starting with manufac-
turing of building materials to demolition, over 80 % of GHG emissions 
take place during the building operation phase (UNEP, 2009) largely 
from consumption of electricity for heating, ventilation, and air condi-
tioning (HVAC), water heating, lighting, and entertainment (US DOE, 
2008). On average, most residential energy in developed countries is 
consumed for space heating, particularly in cold climates. 58 % of the 
demand for energy in buildings was contributed by space heating in 
1990 and 53 % in 2005, while water heating contributed 17 % in 1990 
and 16 % in 2005, appliances 16 % and 21 %, respectively, and cook-
ing and lighting about 5 % (IEA, 2008; UNEP, 2009). In low-income 
countries, a large proportion of operational energy is derived from pol-
luting fuels, mainly wood and other biomass, such as dung and crop 
residues, and a high number of people (2.4 billion) still use biomass for 
cooking and heating (International Energy Agency, 2002, 2006).
5�3�5�3 Industry
Direct emissions from industry (excluding waste / waste water 
and AFOLU contributions10) grew from 5.4 GtCO2eq / yr in 1970 to 
8.8 GtCO2eq / yr in 2010. The contribution of OECD countries dominated 
these emissions at the start of the period with over 57 % of the total 
but declined to 24 % of the total in 2010. The middle-income coun-
tries have become the major emitters, particularly after 2000 (Figure 
5.18) when the annual growth rate in emissions increased very sig-
nificantly in the middle income countries. There is a positive correlation 
between per capita emissions from industry and per capita income up 
to an income level of 10,000 Int$2005 / cap. Beyond that income level, the 
correlation decreases due to improvements in energy efficiency in the 
industrialized OECD countries (European Environment Agency, 2009).
10 Industry emissions including emissions from waste and waste water are reported 
in Section 10.2 in Chapter 10.
Energy use in industry, which is the major source of emissions from 
the sector, has grown in both absolute and relative terms in the OECD-
1990 region and in relative terms in EIT countries driven by changes 
in income, the level of industrial output, fuel switching, and structural 
changes (International Energy Agency, 2003). There has also been a 
complex restructuring and relocation of the production and consump-
tion of goods and supply of services that has shaped the location of 
industrial emissions, resulting in the shift of emissions to some non-
OECD Asian economies (De Backer and Yamano, 2012; Backer and 
Yamano, 2007).
The production of energy-intensive industrial goods including cement, 
steel, aluminium has grown dramatically. From 1970 to 2012, global 
annual production of cement increased 500 %; aluminium 400 %; 
steel 150 %, ammonia 250 %; and paper 200 % (USGS, 2013); with 
energy-intensive industries increasingly being located in developing 
nations (IPCC, 2007a). Rapid growth in export industries has also 
driven emissions growth, and since 2001, China dominates in produc-
tion of goods for own consumption and export (Weber et al., 2008; 
see Chapter 10).
Non-energy industrial emissions such as perfluorocarbon (PFC) emis-
sions have declined in many OECD countries, while trends in SF6 
emissions vary and HFC emissions have increased very rapidly, driven 
more by use in refrigeration equipment (International Energy Agency, 
2003).
5�3�5�4 Agriculture, Forestry, Other Land Use 
Emission of GHGs in the AFOLU sector increased by 20 % from 
9.9 GtCO2eq in 1970 to 12 GtCO2eq in 2010 (Figure 5.18) contrib-
uting about 20 – 25 % of global emissions in 2010 (JRC / PBL, 2013). 
Both the agriculture sub-sector and the FOLU sub-sector showed 
an increase in emissions during the period 1970 – 2010, but there is 
substantial uncertainty and variation between databases (see Sec-
tion  5.2.3); Chapter 11 provides an overview of other estimates. In 
the agriculture sub-sector, CH4 from enteric fermentation and rice 
cultivation, and nitrous oxide (N2O) mainly from soil, application of 
synthetic fertilizer and manure, and manure management made the 
largest contribution (≥  80 %) to total emissions in 2010. Between 
1970 and 2010, emissions of CH4 increased by 20 %, whereas emis-
sions of N2O increased by 45 – 75 %. Though total global emissions 
increased, per capita emissions went down from 2.5 tonnes in 1970 
to 1.7 tonnes in 2010 because of growth in population. Per capita 
Figure 5�19 | The relation between income and GHG emissions for the six key sectors discussed in Sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5 | The left-lower panel presents the relation for emis-
sions aggregated over all sectors. Each circle is one country, for the year 2010 | The area of a circle is proportional to the aggregate emissions for that country and sector, using 
the same scale consistently over all panels. The bubble size is bounded from below for visual ease. Note the logarithmic scales on both x and y axes. For most sectors apart from 
AFOLU, there is a clear positive relation between income and emissions. Data from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012). The direct emission data from JRC / PBL (2013) (see Annex II.9) 
represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to CO2 flux from anthopogenic emission sources in the Forestry and Other Land Use 
(FOLU) sub-sector. For a more detailed representation of Agriculture and FOLU (AFOLU) GHG flux see Section 11.2 and Figures 11.2 and 11.6 | Regions are defined in Annex II.2.
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emissions decreased in LAM, MAF, and EIT countries, whereas in ASIA 
and OECD-1990 countries, it remained almost unchanged. There was 
no clear relation between emissions in the AFOLU sector and per cap-
ita income (Figure 5.19).
Between 2000 and 2010, emission in the AFOLU sector marginally 
increased from 11.0 GtCO2eq to 11.9 GtCO2eq (Figure 5.18), but per 
capita emissions marginally decreased from 1.8 tCO2eq / cap yr to 1.7 
tCO2eq / cap yr (JRC / PBL, 2013).
Drivers of emissions included increased livestock numbers linked to 
increased demand for animal products, area under agriculture, defor-
estation, use of fertilizer, area under irrigation, per capita food avail-
ability, consumption of animal products, and increased human and 
animal populations. Global agricultural land increased by 7 %, from 
4560 Mha to 4900 Mha between 1970 and 2010 (FAOSTAT, 2013). 
Global population increased by about 90 % from 3.6 to 6.9 billion dur-
ing the period. As a result, per capita cropland availability declined by 
about 50 %, from 0.4 ha to 0.2 ha. On the other hand, crop productiv-
ity increased considerably during the period. For example, cereal pro-
duction has doubled from 1.2 Gt to 2.5 Gt and the average yield of 
cereals increased from 1600 kg ha– 1 to 3000 kg ha– 1. To enable this 
increase, use of nitrogenous fertilizer increased by 230 % from 32 Mt 
in 1970 to 106 Mt in 2010 (FAOSTAT, 2013), which was a major driver 
for increased N2O emission (Spark et  al., 2012). During the past 40 
years, there has been increase in irrigated cropped area (Foley et al., 
2005). Population of cattle, sheep, and goats increased 1.4-fold and 
that of pigs and poultry 1.6 and 3.7-fold, respectively (FAOSTAT, 2014). 
This has increased GHG emissions directly and also through manure 
production (Davidson, 2009). Global per capita food availability and 
consumption of animal products increased, particularly in Asia (FAO-
STAT, 2013). 
Emissions in the AFOLU sector increased during the last four decades 
with marginal increase in the last decade (2000 – 2010). The continued 
growth in world population causing greater demand for food with 
reduced per capita land availability will have significant impact on 
emission. Further details of emissions, more on forestry and land use, 
and opportunities for mitigation in the AFOLU sector are discussed in 
Chapter 11.
Box 5�3 | Trends and drivers of GHG emissions in Least Developed Countries
Almost 90 % of 1970 – 2010 GHG emissions in the Least Devel-
oped Countries (LDCs) are generated by agriculture, forestry, and 
other land use activities (AFOLU) (Figure 5.20), and emissions 
have increased by 0.6 % per year in these countries during the last 
four decades. For the LDCs, the primary activities within AFOLU 
include subsistence farming and herding, and use of wood as 
fuel for cooking and heating (Golub et al., 2008; Dauvergne and 
Neville, 2010; Erb et al., 2012).
The effects of population growth on energy use and emissions 
are, in relative terms, greater in the LDCs and developing coun-
tries than in the developed countries (Poumanyvong and Kaneko, 
2010). The dominance of AFOLU over buildings, industry, and 
transport as sources of emissions for LDC (Figure 5.20) suggests 
population growth as a major contributor to the growth in LDC 
emissions. Yet the low historic emissions growth of 0.6 % annu-
ally is substantially below population growth of 2.5 % annually. 
Changes in land use with regard to biofuels (Ewing and Msangi, 
2009) and agricultural practices (Mann et al., 2009; Bryan et al., 
2013) may also have affected the increase in emissions.
Changes in future trends of GHG emissions in LDCs will depend on 
the pace of urbanization and industrialization in the LDCs. 
Although currently most LDCs continue to have a large share of 
rural population, the rate of urbanization is progressing rapidly. 
This pattern is expected to lead to increasing access to and use of 
energy and emissions (Parikh and Shukla, 1995; Holtedahl and 
Joutz, 2004; Alam et al., 2008; Liu, 2009) particularly since early 
stages of urbanization and industrialization are associated with 
higher emissions than later stages (Martínez-Zarzoso and 
Maruotti, 2011).
Figure 5�20 | Territorial GHG emissions per sector in LDCs over 1970 – 2010 
aggregated using 100-year GWP values. The figure shows that for all sectors apart 
from AFOLU, emissions have increased sharply in relative terms. Yet AFOLU pres-
ents the largest share of emissions. Data from JRC / PBL (2013) and IEA (2012). The 
direct emission data from JRC / PBL (2013) (see Annex II.9) represents land-based 
CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to CO2 flux 
from anthopogenic emission sources in the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) 
sub-sector. For a more detailed representation of Agriculture and FOLU (AFOLU) 
GHG flux see Section 11.2 and Figures 11.2 and 11.6.
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5�3�5�5 Waste
Total global emissions from waste almost doubled from 1970 – 2010 
(Figure 5.18), while in the period 2000 – 2010, the increment was 13 % 
(1278 MtCO2eq vs. 1446 MtCO2eq) (JRC / PBL, 2013). In 2010 GHG emis-
sions from waste represented 3.0 % of total GHG emissions from all 
sources (1446 MtCO2eq), compared to 2.6 % in 1970 (734  MtCO2eq) 
(JRC / PBL, 2013). The main sources of waste GHG emissions were solid 
waste disposal on land (46 % of total waste GHG emissions in 1970 
and 43 % in 2010) and wastewater handling (51 % of total waste GHG 
emissions in 1970 and 54 % in 2010), waste incineration (mainly CO2) 
and other sources are of minor importance (JRC / PBL, 2013). 
Since 1998 waste GHG emissions from ASIA are greater than from 
OECD-1990 countries (mainly wastewater emissions). While in 1970 
emissions from OECD-1990 countries represented 50 % of emissions 
(364 MtCO2eq) and ASIA 27 % (199 MtCO2eq), in 2010 ASIA repre-
sented 41 % of waste GHG emissions (596 MtCO2eq) and OECD-1990 
27 % (391 MtCO2eq) (Figure 5.18) (JRC / PBL, 2013). The main GHG 
from waste is CH4 — mainly emitted from municipal solid waste dis-
posal on land and from wastewater — representing 91 % of the total 
in 1970 (90 % in 2010), followed by N2O (7 % in 1970, 8 % in 2010) 
(Monni et al., 2006; JRC / PBL, 2013).
Waste generation is closely related to population, urbanization, and 
affluence (see also Section 10.14). Waste generation rates are corre-
lated with different indicators of affluence, including GDP per capita, 
energy consumption per capita, and private final consumption per cap-
ita (Monni et al., 2006; Bogner et al., 2008). Similarly Sjöström and Öst-
blom (2009) remark that waste quantities have grown steadily along 
with GDP over recent decades. Moreover they report that the total 
quantity of municipal waste per capita increased by 29 % in North 
America, 35 % in OECD, and 54 % in the EU15 from 1980 to 2005 
(Sjöström and Östblom, 2009).
There are many uncertainties concerning estimation of past, current, 
and future emissions, as well as the mitigation potential in the waste 
sector, the most important relating to the poor quality of the activity 
data needed for estimation of emissions (Monni et al., 2006; Bogner 
et al., 2008).
5.4 Production and 
trade patterns
5�4�1 Embedded carbon in trade
Between 1971 and 2010, world trade has grown by 6 % a year on 
average, meaning it doubled nearly every 12 years (World Trade Organ-
isation, 2011), outpacing the growth of world GDP, which was 3.1 % 
per year on average. The ratio of world exports of goods and commer-
cial services to GDP in real terms has increased substantially; steadily 
since 1985, and by nearly one-third between 2000 and 2008, before 
dropping in 2009 as world trade fell as a result of the Global Financial 
Crisis (World Trade Organisation, 2011). While information on the size 
of physical trade is more limited, Dittrich and Bringezu (2010) estimate 
that between 1970 and 2005, the physical tonnage of international 
trade grew from 5.4 to 10 Gt. Statistics on CO2 emissions associated 
with international shipping support these findings (Heitmann and 
Khalilian, 2011); international shipping has grown at a rate of 3.1 % 
per annum for the past three decades (Eyring et al., 2010), and there 
is evidence of a recent acceleration in seaborne trade suggesting that 
trade, measured in ton-miles has increased by 5.2 % per annum (on 
average) between 2002 and 2007. This is further supported by van 
Renssen (2012), who observes a doubling of shipping and aviation 
emissions between 1990 and 2010.
Trade has increased the developing countries’ participation in the 
global economy. According to the World Trade Organization, “From 
1990 to 2008, the volume of exports from developing countries grew 
consistently faster than exports from developed countries, as did the 
share of developing countries’ exports in the value of total world 
exports”. Between 2000 and 2008, the volume of developing coun-
tries’ exports almost doubled, while world exports increased by 50 %. 
Non-OECD Asia is by far the most important exporting region in the 
developing country group, with a 10 % share of world exports in 1990 
(USD 335 million), which increased to 21 % (USD 2603 million) in 2009 
(World Trade Organisation, 2011).
The consumption accounts presented in Section 5.3.3.2 showed that 
between 1990 and 2000, global CO2 emissions increased by about 10 %, 
and by a further 29 % between 2000 and 2008 (Le Quere et al., 2009; 
Peters et al., 2011). Over the full period, all of the growth in CO2 emis-
sions occurred in non-Annex B countries while CO2 emissions in Annex 
B countries stabilized. Partly, this was due to the collapse of the for-
mer Soviet Union in the early 1990s, which reduced emissions in these 
countries between 1990 and 2000. But the pattern also relates to the 
rapid increase in international trade between Annex B and non-Annex 
B countries. Twenty percent of the growth in CO2 emissions in non-
Annex B countries can, through trade, be attributed to the increased 
demand for products by Annex B countries (Peters et al., 2011). 
In 1990, the global CO2 emissions associated with exported products 
was 4.3 GtCO2 (Peters et al., 2011). This figure includes the CO2 emis-
sions through the whole supply chain associated with the production 
of the final product, using the ‘Environmentally Extended Multi-Region 
Input-Output Analysis’ (Davis and Caldeira, 2010; Minx et al., 2009). In 
2008, this figure had increased to 7.8 GtCO2, (average annual increase 
of 4.3 %) (Peters et al., 2011). Between 1990 and 2000, the growth in 
the embedded CO2 emissions of products being traded grew by 10 %. 
Between 2000 and 2008, CO2 emissions embedded in trade grew by a 
further 26 %, demonstrating a more recent and rapid increase (Peters 
et al., 2011). In 2005, China accounted for 25 % of the total global CO2 
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emissions embedded in exports, with China’s exported emissions at 
1.7 Gt (Weber et  al., 2008) compared to the global total of 6.8 Gt 
(Peters et al., 2011). In terms of total CO2 emissions due to the produc-
tion of goods and services that were finally consumed in another coun-
try, a number of papers suggest that this represents between 20 % and 
26 % of total global emissions in 2004 (Davis and Caldeira, 2010; 
Peters et al., 2011).
Trade explains the divergence between territorial and consumption-
based emissions in OECD countries to the extent that it has resulted 
in an increase of emissions in the exporting countries. The associated 
increase in emissions in exporting countries (mostly non Annex B) is 
often defined in the literature as ‘weak leakage’ (see Box 5.4) (Davis and 
Caldeira, 2010; Rothman, 2000; Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Weber and 
Peters, 2009; Strømman et  al., 2009; Peters, 2010; Yunfeng and Laike, 
2010). Lenzen et  al. (2010) confirm these findings along with numer-
ous national-level studies (Wiedmann et al., 2010; Hong et al., 2007; Liu 
et al., 2011; Ackerman et al., 2007; Weber and Matthews, 2007; Mäen-
pää and Siikavirta, 2007; Muñoz and Steininger, 2010; Minx et al., 2011). 
Trade has allowed countries with a higher than global average emis-
sion intensity to import lower emission intensity goods and vice versa. 
For example, exports from China have a carbon intensity four times 
higher than exports from the United States (Davis and Caldeira, 2010). 
Net exports of carbon could occur due to (i) a current account sur-
plus, (ii) a relatively high energy intensity of production, (iii) a relatively 
high carbon intensity of energy production, and (iv) specialization in 
the export of carbon-intensive products (Jakob et  al., 2013). Jakob 
and Marchinski (2013) argue that further analysis is required to better 
understand the gap in consumption and territorial emissions, and to 
assess the validity of possible but different causes.
Calculating emissions embodied in trade tells us the amount of emis-
sions generated to produce goods and services that are consumed 
elsewhere, but it doesn’t allow us to establish a causal interpretation. 
In particular, it doesn’t allow identifying which fraction of observed 
changes in regional emissions can be attributed to regulatory changes 
undertaken elsewhere, such as adoption of climate measures in one 
region (often called ‘strong carbon leakage’ in the literature). Due to 
the sparse data available, only a few empirical studies exist. (Aichele 
and Felbermayr, 2012, 2013) provide evidence for a strong carbon 
leakage effect resulting from the Kyoto protocol. Most estimates of 
how GHG emissions could react to regional regulatory changes have 
so far relied on numerical modelling. These studies find a wide variety 
of rates of leakage (i. e., the fraction of unilateral emission reductions 
that are offset by increases in other regions), with one study demon-
strating that under some specific assumptions, leakages rates could 
even exceed 100 % (Babiker, 2005). However, it has also been pointed 
out that energy represents a small fraction of the total cost for most 
industries and therefore leakage should not be expected to render 
unilateral climate policies grossly ineffective (Hourcade et al., 2008; 
Jakob, 2011). This is confirmed by recent model comparison of 12 
computable general equilibrium models. Boehringer et al. (2012) finds 
leakage rates between 5 % and 19 %, with a mean value of 12 %. 
However, taking into account (non-energy related) industrial process 
emissions, which are not included in the latter model comparison, 
may result in higher leakage rates, as some of the most energy — as 
well as trade-intensive sectors are also important sources of industrial 
process emissions (Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012) find that accounting for 
industrial process emissions raises the leakage rate by one-third.
5�4�2 Trade and productivity
Trade does not only affect emissions through its effect on consumption 
patterns, the relocation of production, and emissions for international 
transport, it also affects emissions through its effect on innovation and 
the exchange of technologies between trading partners. Section 5.6 
Box 5�4 | Definition of carbon leakage
Carbon leakage refers to phenomena whereby the reduction in 
emissions (relative to a benchmark) are offset by an increase 
outside the jurisdiction (Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Barrett et al., 
2013). Leakage can occur at a number of levels, be it a project, 
state, province, nation, or world region. This can occur through:
•	 Changes in the relative prices whereby national climate 
regulation reduces demand for fossil fuels, thereby causing a 
fall in world prices resulting in an increase in demand outside 
the jurisdiction
•	 Relocation of industry where a firm relocates their opera-
tion to another nation due to less favourable financial benefits 
in the original jurisdiction brought about by the reduction 
measures
•	 Nested regulation where, for example, the European Union 
imposes an aggregate cap on emissions meaning that the 
efforts of individual countries exceed the cap freeing up allow-
ances in other country under the scheme
•	 Weak consumption leakage describes the increase of emis-
sions in one country as a consequence of actions or policies 
that are unrelated to climate policy (such as a changed quan-
tity or composition of imports) in another country.
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assesses the literature on innovation while this section assesses the 
theoretical and empirical literature on channels through which trade 
(broadly defined as trade in goods and foreign direct investment) 
affects productivity (Havrylyshyn, 1990). 
At the aggregate level, trade can improve productivity through 
increased allocative efficiency. Furthermore, trade increases the inter-
national flow of intermediate goods (Hummels et al., 2001; Koopman 
et al., 2008), allowing for the production of higher-quality final prod-
ucts with the same amount of emissions and other inputs (Ruther-
ford and Tarr, 2002). Though, trade may impede productivity growth 
in developing countries if it causes them to specialize in low-tech 
labour and energy intensive sectors with little scope for productivity 
improvements. Trade can also increase income inequality in develop-
ing countries. For example, because the least skill-intensive industries 
in developed countries often become the most skill-intensive sectors 
in developing countries (Zhu and Trefler, 2005; Meschi and Vivarelli, 
2009), developing countries can experience a negative impact on pro-
ductivity growth (Persson and Tabellini, 1994).
At the sector level, trade liberalization increases competition in import-
competing sectors, and causes the least-productive firms in these 
sectors to collapse or exit (Pavcnik, 2002). Therefore, through this 
mechanism, trade liberalization can cause job losses, especially for 
those working in the previously protected sectors. At the same time, 
trade can also increase productivity, energy-efficiency, and research 
and development (R&D) incentives in import-competing sectors: trade 
intensifies import-competition and increases the remaining firms’ 
domestic market shares, both of which are associated with higher R&D 
efforts — possibly because firms with large market shares use innova-
tion to deter entry (Blundell et al., 1999).
Aside allocation and competition effects, trade can increase produc-
tivity growth through knowledge spillovers. Multinationals do more 
R&D than purely domestic firms, thus Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
can increase the knowledge stock of the recipient country. Moreover, 
the entry of foreign multinationals facilitates the diffusion of energy-
saving technologies if domestic firms reverse-engineer their products 
or hire away their employees (Keller and Yeaple, 2009). In addition to 
these horizontal spillovers, foreign entrants have an incentive to share 
their knowledge with domestic suppliers and customers to improve 
the quality of domestically sourced inputs and to enable domestic 
customers to make better use of their products (Javorcik, 2004).
Turning to empirical analyses, there are many studies that estimate 
the effect of trade on sector overall productivity or the international 
diffusion of specific technologies, but little that quantify the effect 
of trade, through productivity, on emissions. Empirical work, mostly 
focusing on labour and total factor productivity, suggests that trade 
openness indeed enhances productivity. Coe and Helpman (1995) 
and Edwards (2001) find that foreign R&D has a larger positive 
effect for countries with a higher import volume, and that for small 
countries, foreign R&D matters more for domestic productivity than 
domestic R&D. Keller (2000) finds that imports from high-productivity 
countries lead to more productivity growth than imports from low-
productivity countries. According to Kim (2000), trade liberalization 
increased total factor productivity growth by 2 percentage points in 
Korea between 1985 – 1988. For United States firms, FDI spillovers 
accounted for 14 % of productivity growth between 1987 – 1996 
(Keller and Yeaple, 2009).
With regards to specifically environmental applications, Verdolini and 
Galeotti (2011a) and Bosetti and Verdolini (2012) constructed and 
tested a model to show that the factors that impede international 
trade in physical goods, such as geographic distance, also hinder the 
diffusion of environmentally benign technologies. Reppelin-Hill (1998) 
finds that the Electric Arc Furnace, a technology for cleaner steel pro-
duction, diffused faster in countries that are more open to trade. Trade 
reduces global energy efficiency if it relocates production to countries 
that have a comparative advantage in unskilled labour but low-energy 
efficiency (Li and Hewitt, 2008). Lastly, Mulder and De Groot (2007) 
document a convergence of energy-productivity across OECD coun-
tries over time. The results may be attributable to knowledge diffusion 
through trade, but the authors do not estimate a link between conver-
gence and trade.
5.5 Consumption and 
behavioural change
Behaviour is an underlying driver affecting the factors in the decom-
position of anthropogenic GHG emissions. Although it is difficult to 
delineate and attribute the effects of behaviour unambiguously, there 
is empirical evidence of variation in behaviour and consumption pat-
terns across regions, social groups, and over time, and its connection 
to, e. g., energy and emission intensity of consumption.
This section reviews the evidence of how behaviour affects energy use 
and emissions through technological choices, lifestyles, and consump-
tion preferences. It focuses on behaviour of consumers and produc-
ers, delineates the factors influencing behaviour change, and reviews 
policies and measures that have historically been effective in changing 
behaviour for the benefit of climate change mitigation.
5�5�1 Impact of behaviour on consumption 
and emissions
Consumer choices with regard to food, mobility, and housing, and 
more generally consumption patterns affect the environmental impact 
and GHG emissions associated with the services (Faber et al., 2012). 
Consumption patterns are shaped not only by economic forces, but 
also by technological, political, cultural, psychological, and environ-
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mental factors. For example, domestic energy use and travel choices 
are intrinsically related to social identity, status, and norms (Layton 
et  al., 1993; Black et  al., 2001; Steg et  al., 2001; Exley and Christie, 
2002). Senses of security, clean environment, family ties, and friend-
ships are also viewed as important factors in determining consump-
tion patterns (Chitnis and Hunt, 2012). The cultural context in which 
an individual lives and the inherent values of a society also shape the 
intrinsic motivation underlying consumer choices (Fuhrer et al., 1995; 
Chawla, 1998, 1999). As an example, the high proportion of people fol-
lowing a vegetarian diet in India can be attributed to its cultures and 
religions, resulting in lower GHG emissions per caloric intake (Ghosh, 
2006). Similar explanations are given for India’s relatively low levels 
of waste generation coupled with higher levels of waste recycling and 
re-use (Ghosh, 2006). Cross-cultural differences are also revealed at 
higher-income levels. In some high-income countries people appreciate 
high-density neighbourhoods and public transport more as compared 
to other countries (Roy and Pal, 2009).
Studies indicate that approximately one-third of food produced for 
human consumption (about 1.3  billion tonnes per year) is wasted 
globally, adding to GHG emissions for food production (Gustavsson 
et al., 2011). It is estimated that substantially more food is wasted 
in the developed countries than in developing countries. In Europe 
and North America, per capita food waste by consumers is estimated 
at 95 – 115 kg / year, while in sub-Saharan Africa and South / South-
east Asia is about 6 – 11 kg / year (Gustavsson et al., 2011). There is 
significant inter-regional variation with regard to the stage of the 
food chain at which wastage occurs. About 40 % of food wastage in 
medium- and high-income countries is generated at the consumer 
and retail stages, while in low-income countries food waste at the 
consumer level is much smaller and food waste in the early and mid-
dle stages of the food supply chain reaches about 40 %. Food losses 
and waste in low-income countries are attributed to financial, mana-
gerial, and technical limitations, while consumer behaviour and lack 
of coordination between different actors in the supply chain influ-
ence food wastage in the high-income countries (Gustavsson et al., 
2011).
Empirical evidence indicates that per capita energy consumption var-
ies widely across regions (see Sections 5.3 and 5.4), resulting in sig-
nificantly different CO2 emissions in per capita terms and per unit 
economic activity, but that GDP per capita does not explain all varia-
tion (see Figures 5.16 and 5.19). While part of this variability can be 
attributed, inter alia, to population density, infrastructure and resource 
endowments, social and cultural predispositions, such as lifestyle, also 
influence the choice and consumption levels of energy and materials 
(Marechal, 2009; Tukker et al., 2010; Sovacool and Brown, 2010). His-
toric data show a clear increase at the global level of key consumption 
activities of households that contribute to emissions, such as personal 
travel by car, intake of meat and fossil fuel consumption (Mont and 
Plepys, 2008). Energy intensity, which depends on behaviour at the 
individual and economy-wide level, is therefore one of the key determi-
nants of emissions in the decomposition analysis. Behaviour is not only 
an implicit and relevant driver of emissions, but also equally important 
a potential agent for change in emissions. 
Apart from individuals and households, companies and organizations 
also contribute to emissions, through both direct and indirect use of 
energy. Businesses, policy makers, as well as non-governmental con-
sumer organizations also play a role in inducing behaviour change and 
therefore indirectly changing emissions. Studies show that environ-
mental values are important determinants of willingness to accept cli-
mate change policy measures, and that values and norms are required 
for climate policy support within public and private organizations (Biel 
and Lundqvist, 2012). 
Technological solutions directed at improving resource productivity 
may not be sufficient for curbing the environmental impact of con-
sumption (Hunt and Sendhil, 2010). Complementary to eco-efficiency 
in production, sustainable development strategies may need to sup-
port sufficiency in consumption, shifting from a culture of consumerism 
without limits to a society with less materialistic aspirations (Mont and 
Plepys, 2008). This implies an addition to the focus on more environ-
mentally sound products and services; finding happiness with lower 
levels of material consumption, especially in higher-income countries 
(Hunt and Sendhil, 2010).
5�5�2 Factors driving change in 
 behaviour
The literature differentiates between efficiency behaviours, (1) the 
purchase of more or less energy-efficient equipment (e. g., insula-
tion), and (2) curtailment behaviours that involve repetitive efforts to 
reduce energy use, such as lowering thermostat settings (Gardner and 
Stern, 1996). It is suggested that the energy saving potential through 
efficiency behaviour is greater than that through curtailment behav-
iour. However, energy-efficient appliances can lead to an increase in 
demand for the service due to the lower cost of these services, dis-
cussed in Section 5.6.2.
Behavioural economics studies anomalies in consumer’s energy 
choices but it is also used to design approaches aimed at influencing 
and modifying those behaviours (see Sections 2.4 and 3.10.1). There 
is evidence that consumers consistently fail to choose appliances that 
offer energy savings, which, according to engineering estimates, more 
than compensate for their higher capital cost. In analyses of appliance 
choices, Hausman (1979) and subsequent studies found implicit con-
sumer discount rates ranging from 25 % to over 100 % (Train, 1985; 
Sanstad et  al., 2006). A variety of explanations have been offered, 
including consumer uncertainty regarding savings, lack of liquidity 
and financing constraints, other hidden costs, and the possibility that 
the engineering estimates may overstate energy savings in practice. 
Recent ideas draw on bounded rationality, the notion that consum-
ers ‘satisfice’ rather than ‘optimize’ (Simon, 1957), the importance of 
non-price product attributes and consumers’ perceptions thereof (Lan-
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caster, 1965; Van den Bergh, 2008), and asymmetric information and 
the principal-agent problem (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz, 1988). From psy-
chology and behavioural economics come notions such as loss aver-
sion (consumers place more weight on avoiding a loss than on secur-
ing a gain of the same magnitude (Kahneman et al., 1982); see Greene 
(2011) for an application to energy efficiency), attention11 and the role 
of salience12 (Fiske and Morling, 1996), priming (Richardson-Klavehn 
and Bjork, 1988), affect (Slovic et al., 2002), norms13 (Axelrod, 2006), 
a present-bias in inter-temporal decision making (O’Donoghue and 
Rabin, 2008; DellaVigna, 2009), and mental accounts (separate deci-
sion making for subsets of commodities; Thaler, 1999). The literature is 
not unanimous, though, regarding the magnitude of the ‘energy effi-
ciency gap’ (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012).
Ayres et al. (2009) estimate that non-price, peer-comparison interven-
tions can induce a consumption response equivalent to a 17 – 29 % 
price increase.14 Newell et al. (1999) provides evidence that the United 
States room air conditioners energy efficiency gain since 1973 is only 
about one quarter induced by higher energy prices, while another 
quarter is due to raised government standards and labelling. 
Behavioural interventions can be aimed at voluntary behavioural 
change by targeting an individual’s perceptions, preferences, and 
abilities, or at changing the context in which decisions are made. 
Such non-price context interventions have been used across coun-
tries with varying degrees of success to bring about behaviour change 
in consumption choices and patterns of energy use. These include 
antecedent strategies (involving commitment, goal setting, informa-
tion or modelling) and consequence strategies (feedback or rewards) 
(Abrahamse et al., 2005; Fischer, 2008). As an example, the Property 
Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) program tackles the high-discount 
rate that residential energy users ascribe to investments associated 
with energy-efficiency retrofits of buildings through providing local 
governments financing for retrofits of buildings repayable through 
a supplement to property taxes (Ameli and Kammen, 2012). Various 
United States and United Kingdom government agencies and the pri-
vate sector, including some electric and water utilities, have developed 
strategies collected under the rubrics Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2009) and Mindspace (Dolan et al., 2012). These programs involve ele-
ments such as increasing the salience of financial incentives, invok-
ing norms, providing information on social comparisons, and modify-
ing the choice architecture (the structure of the choice) including the 
default alternative.15 Laboratory studies and small-scale pilots have 
11 For example, Allcott (2011) indicates that 40 % of US consumers do not consider a 
vehicle’s gasoline consumption when purchasing a car.
12 Chetty et al. (2009) show that consumers’ reaction to taxes depends on the vis-
ibility and salience of the tax.
13 Responsiveness to norm-based messages has been demonstrated in a number of 
domains (e. g., Frey and Meier, 2004; Cialdini et al., 2006; Salganik et al., 2006; 
Goldstein et al., 2008; Cai et al., 2009).
14 Similarly, with household water use, Ferraro and Price (2011) find that the social-
comparison effect is equivalent to what would be expected if average prices were 
to increase by 12 % to 15 %.
15 UK Cabinet Office (2012).
demonstrated a potential role for behavioural interventions, but there 
is uncertainty on the scalability of these interventions and the level of 
impacts they can achieve (Hunt and Sendhil, 2010). 
The state of awareness and concern about climate change and the will-
ingness to act is an important underlying driver for voluntary reduction 
in energy consumption by individuals. Some studies indicate that the 
provision of information, or awareness creation by itself, is unlikely to 
bring about significant change in consumption behaviour and reduc-
tion in emissions (Van Houwelingen and Van Raaij, 1989; Kollmuss and 
Agyeman, 2002; Jackson, 2005). Other studies indicate that awareness 
creation and provision of information facilitates the deployment of 
energy-efficient technologies. The establishing of benchmarks for the 
energy consumption of homes and commercial buildings may con-
tribute to reduce information asymmetries in the marketplace and to 
lower the discount rates used by consumers to evaluate future effi-
ciency gains (Cox et al., 2013). Coller and Williams (1999) suggest that 
information about energy consumption will result in a 5 % decline in 
discount rates for energy decisions made by the median population, an 
estimate that is adopted by Cox et al. (2013).
Rewards are seen to have effectively encouraged energy conservation, 
though with possibly short-lived effects (Dwyer and Leeming, 1993; 
Geller, 2002). Feedback has also proven to be useful, particularly when 
given frequently (Becker et  al., 1981), while a combination of strat-
egies is generally found to be more effective than applying any one 
strategy (Abrahamse et al., 2005).
Ability to change, or opportunities, is also essential, and can be con-
strained by institutional and physical structures. Old habits are also seen 
as a strong barrier to changing energy behaviours (Pligt, 1985; Kollmuss 
and Agyeman, 2002; Mont and Plepys, 2008; Whitmarsh, 2009).
5.6 Technological change
5�6�1 Contribution of technological change to 
mitigation
The AR4 acknowledged the importance of technological change as 
a driver for climate change mitigation (IPCC, 2007a). It also gave an 
extensive review of technological change and concluded, among other 
things, that there is a relationship between environmental regulation 
and innovative activity on environmental technologies, but that policy 
is not the only determinant for technological change. It also discussed 
the debate around technology push and market pull for technologi-
cal change, the role of different actors and market failures around 
technological innovation. Since 2007, more studies have documented 
improvements of energy efficiency and the impact of different drivers, 
including technological change, on energy intensity (e. g., Fan and Xia; 
Sheinbaum et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012). 
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5�6�1�1 Technological change: a drive towards higher or 
lower emissions?
Previous assessment reports have focused on the contribution of 
technological change in reducing GHG emissions. The rising emissions 
in emerging economies and accompanied rapid technological change, 
however, point at a question of whether technological change might 
also lead to rising emissions — in developed and developing coun-
tries. Due to a combination of rebound effects (see Section 5.6.2) and 
an observed tendency towards cost-saving innovations, the rebound 
effect could be enhanced so much that energy-saving technological 
change could indirectly lead to an increase in emissions (Fisher-Van-
den and Ho, 2010). Probably more importantly, technological change 
may favour non-mitigation issues over reduction of GHG emissions. 
For example, compact cars in the 1930s have a similar fuel consump-
tion rate to compact cars in the 1990s, but have far advanced in 
terms of speed, comfort, safety, and air pollution (Azar and Dowla-
tabadi, 1999). 
The energy sector is of great importance to technological change and 
climate change mitigation. Changes in the energy intensity that are 
not related to changes in the relative price of energy are often called 
changes in the autonomous energy-efficiency index (Kaufmann, 2004; 
Stern, 2011). How do macro-economic factors affect differences in 
energy efficiency between countries and changes over time? Using 
country-based case study approach, the general trend at the macro-level 
over the 20th century in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, 
and Austria has been to greater energy efficiency (Warr et al., 2010). 
Recent research investigates the factors that affect the adoption of 
energy-efficiency policies or energy-efficiency technology (Matisoff, 
2008; Fredriksson et  al., 2004; Gillingham et  al., 2009; Linares and 
Labandeira, 2010; Wei et  al., 2009; Popp, 2011; Stern, 2011). Differ-
ences in endowments, preferences, or the state of technology create 
differences in the adoption of energy-efficiency technologies across 
countries and among individuals over time. The rate of adoption may 
also be influenced by market failures such as environmental externali-
ties, information access, and liquidity constraints in capital markets, 
and behavioural factors. Behavioural factors are discussed in Section 
5.5.2. The variation of implementation of energy-efficiency measures 
varies greatly, both between countries and between sectors and indus-
tries, especially if developing countries are taken into account (Sanstad 
et al., 2006).
5�6�1�2 Historical patterns of technological change
There is ample evidence from historical studies, for instance in the 
United States, Germany, and Japan, that technological change can 
affect energy use (Carley, 2011b; Welsch and Ochsen, 2005; Unruh, 
2000). In Japan, it has also shown to be a driver for reduction of CO2 
emissions (Okushima and Tamura, 2010). Technological change is also 
a dominant factor in China’s fast-declining energy intensity until 2003 
(Ma and Stern, 2008); but between 2003 and 2010, energy intensity 
declined only slightly (IEA, 2012).
Technological change in the energy sector is best studied. Several 
studies find that technological change in energy was particularly 
pronounced in periods with a great political sense of urgency and / or 
energy price hikes, such as during oil crises (Okushima and Tamura, 
2010; Karanfil and Yeddir-Tamsamani, 2010). Wilbanks (2011) ana-
lyzes the discovery of innovations and argues that only with a national 
sense of threat and the entailing political will it is worthwhile and 
possible to set up an “exceptional R&D” effort in the field of climate 
change mitigation. Aghion et al. (2012) conclude an increase in clean 
technology patenting in the auto industry as a consequence of policy-
induced increases in energy prices. In a study on 38 countries, Verdolini 
and Galeotti (2011b) find that technological opportunity and policy, 
proxied by energy prices, affect the flow of knowledge and technologi-
cal spillovers. 
There is more evidence supporting the conclusion that policy matters 
as a part of systemic developments. Dechezleprêtre (2008) find that 
the Kyoto Protocol has a positive impact on patenting and cross-border 
technology transfer, although they did not evaluate the impact of those 
on emissions. In a study on photovoltaic (PV) technology in China, a 
policy-driven effort to catch up in critical technological areas related to 
manufacturing proved successful, although it also mattered that capa-
bilities could be built through the returning of a Chinese diaspora (de 
la Tour et  al., 2011). Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2012) show that the 
European Union Emissions Trading System led to an increase in climate 
technology-related patents in the European Union.
5�6�2 The rebound effect
Section 3.9.5 distinguishes between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ rebound 
effects. Direct rebounds appear when, for example, an energy-efficient 
car has lower-operating costs encouraging the owner to drive fur-
ther (Sorrell, 2007). In addition, this could apply to a company where 
new, more energy efficient technology reduces costs and leads to an 
increase in production. Indirect rebounds (Lovins, 1988; Sorrell, 2007) 
appear when increased real income is made available by saving energy 
costs that are then used to invest or purchase other goods and services 
that emit GHG emissions (Berkhout et al., 2000; Thomas and Azevedo, 
2013). For example, savings in fuel due to a more-efficient car pro-
vides more disposable income that could be spent on an additional 
holiday. These could include substitution or income effects or changes 
in consumption patterns (Thomas and Azevedo, 2013). Economy-wide 
changes include market price effects, economic growth effects, and 
adjustments in capital stocks that result in further increases in long-
run demand response for energy (Howarth, 1997).
Rebound effects are context-specific, making it difficult to generalize 
on their relative size and importance. Being context-specific means 
that there is evidence of both negative rebound effects where further 
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energy saving is induced beyond the initial savings and ‘backfire’ where 
the rebound effects exceed the initial saving (Gillingham et al., 2013; 
Chakravarty et al., 2013; Saunders, 2013). There is much debate on the 
size of the rebound effect with considerably more evidence on direct 
rebounds than on indirect rebounds. There are numerous studies rely-
ing predominately on econometric techniques to evaluate rebounds. A 
comprehensive review of 500 studies suggests that direct rebounds are 
likely to be over 10 % and could be considerably higher (i. e., 10 % less 
savings than the projected saving from engineering principles). Other 
reviews have shown larger ranges with Thomas and Azevedo (2013) 
suggesting between 0 and 60 %. For household-efficiency measures, 
the majority of studies show rebounds in developed countries in the 
region of 20 – 45 % (the sum of direct and indirect rebound effects), 
meaning that efficiency measures achieve 65 – 80 % of their original 
purposes (Greening et al., 2000; Bentzen, 2004; Sorrell, 2007; Sorrell 
et al., 2009; Haas and Biermayr, 2000; Berkhout et al., 2000; Schipper 
and Grubb, 2000; Freire González, 2010). For private transport, there 
are some studies that support higher rebounds, with Frondel et  al. 
(2012) findings rebounds of between 57 and 62 %.
There is evidence to support the claim that rebound effects can be higher 
in developing countries (Wang et al., 2012b; Fouquet, 2012; Chakravarty 
et al., 2013). Roy (2000) argues that rebound effects in the residential 
sector in India and other developing countries can be expected to be 
larger than in developed economies because high-quality energy use is 
still small in households in India and demand is very elastic (van den 
Bergh, 2010; Stern, 2011; Thomas and Azevedo, 2013). However, there 
is considerable uncertainty of the precise scale of rebound effects in 
developing countries with more research required (Thomas and Aze-
vedo, 2013; Chakravarty et al., 2013). In terms of developed countries, 
Fouquet (2012) provides evidence on diminishing rebound effects in 
developed countries due to less inelastic demand for energy.
While generalization is difficult, a circumstance where rebounds are 
high is when energy costs form a large proportion of total costs (Sor-
rell, 2007). Rebounds effects are often diminished where energy-effi-
ciency improvements are coupled with an increase in energy prices. 
For industry, targeted carbon-intensity improvements can reduce costs 
and therefore prices and subsequently increase output (Barker et al., 
2007). Therefore, the relative scale of the saving is a good indicator 
of the potential size of the rebound effect. In conclusion, rebound 
effects cannot be ignored, but at the same time do not make energy-
efficiency measures completely redundant. By considering the size of 
the rebound effect, a more-realistic calculation of energy-efficiency 
measures can be achieved providing a clearer understanding of their 
contribution to climate policy. Particular attention is required where 
efficiency saving are made with no change in the unit cost of energy.
5�6�3 Infrastructure choices and lock in
Infrastructure in a broad sense covers physical, technological, and insti-
tutional categories but is often narrowed down to long-lasting and 
capital-intensive physical assets to which public access is allowed, such 
as transport infrastructure (Ballesteros et al., 2010; Cloete and Venter, 
2012). The assessment in this part focuses on the narrower physical 
part. Among physical infrastructure are buildings, roads and bridges, 
ports, airports, railways, power, telecom, water supply and waste water 
treatment, irrigation systems, and the like. Energy consumption and 
CO2 emissions vary greatly between different types of infrastructure. 
Infrastructure choices reflect the practice at the time of investment but 
they have long-lasting consequences. The infrastructure and technol-
ogy choices made by industrialized countries in the post-World War II 
period, at low energy prices, still have an effect on current worldwide 
GHG emissions. Davis et al. (2010) estimate the commitment to future 
emissions and warming by existing CO2-emitting devices, totalling to 
500 (280 – 700) GtCO2 between 2010 and 2060, and an associated 
warming of 1.3 °C (1.1 °C to 1.4 °C). 
Transport is a case in point. Air, rail, and road transport systems all rely 
on a supporting infrastructure, and compete for distances in the range 
of 1500 km. Of these options, railways typically have the lowest emis-
sions, but they require substantial infrastructure investments. Similarly, 
for urban transport, public transport requires substantial infrastructure 
investments to provide mobility with relatively low-emission intensi-
ties. At the same time, existing roads are designed for use for decades 
and consequently automobiles remain a major means for mobility. In 
United States cities, 20 – 30 % of the land-area is used for roads, the 
corresponding share for major cities in Asia is 10 – 12 % (Banister and 
Thurstain-Goodwin, 2011; Banister, 2011a; b). But the emerging mega-
cities around the world are associated with population expansion and 
large-scale increase in infrastructure supply. Investment in urban phys-
ical investment in these emerging megacities will have a significant 
long-lasting impact on GHG emissions. Investment in waste disposal 
facilities (incinerators) is an example of a path dependency and lock-in 
of an industry barrier that will prevent material efficiency strategies 
for a long period of time. A recent study proves how this lock-in effect 
in places such as Denmark, Sweden, Germany, or the Netherlands is 
threatening recycling and encouraging the shipment of waste that oth-
erwise could be treated locally with less environmental cost (Sora and 
Ventosa, 2013).
Carley (2011a) provides historical evidence from the United States 
electricity sector indicating that crucial drivers — market, firm, govern-
ment, and consumer — can work together to improve efficiency, but 
that they can also lead to ‘‘persistent market and policy failures that 
can inhibit the diffusion of carbon-saving technologies despite their 
apparent environmental and economic advantages” (Unruh, 2000, 
2002). 
Avoiding the lock-in in emission-intensive physical infrastructure is 
highly important to reduce emissions not only in the short run but also 
far into the future. At the planning stage, when choice of materials and 
construction are made, a forward-looking life-cycle assessment can 
help to reduce undesired lock-in effects with respect to the construc-
tion and operation of large physical infrastructure.
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5.7 Co-benefits and 
adverse side-effects of 
 mitigation actions
The implementation of mitigation policies and measures can have 
positive or negative effects on broader economic, social, and / or 
environmental objectives−and vice versa. As both co-benefits and 
adverse side-effects occur, the net effect is sometimes difficult to 
establish (Holland, 2010).16 The extent to which co-benefits and 
adverse side-effects will materialize in practice as well as their net 
effect on social welfare differ greatly across regions, and is strongly 
dependent on local circumstances, implementation practices, as well 
as the scale and pace of the deployment of the different mitigation 
measures (see Section 6.6). Section 4.8 relates co-benefits to sustain-
able development, Section 5.2 covers the historic emission trends of 
many substances related to air quality co-benefits and adverse side-
effects, Section 6.6 covers the forward-looking perspective, and the 
sectoral dimensions are discussed in Sections 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, and 
11.7. While Section 12.8 focuses on co-effects in cities, Chapter 15 
considers the policy implications. This section looks at co-benefits 
and adverse effects from a macro-perspective to understand their 
role in decision making for climate change mitigation and sustain-
able development. We focus on cross-sectoral air pollution literature 
and the role of pollutant emission trends and briefly discuss the dif-
ficulty for assessing the role of co-benefits and adverse effects as 
an underlying driver when it plays a role for GHG-mitigation deci-
sions. Figure 5.21 offers a picture of the connection between cli-
mate change and other social and environmental objectives through 
policies affecting the emissions of various substances. The following 
chapters will assess many of these interactions between air pollut-
ants associated with the combustion of fossil fuels and their direct 
and indirect impacts.
The quantitative key findings of the AR4 were three-fold: First, the 
reduction of fossil fuel combustion will lead to the reduction of a num-
ber of air pollutants that interact with a number of policy objectives 
(see Figure 7.8). Second, the policy costs of achieving air pollution 
objectives through direct control measures decrease as a result of miti-
gation policies. Third, monetized health benefits counterbalance a sub-
stantial fraction of mitigation costs, even exceeding them in certain 
cases, particularly in developing countries (Barker et  al., 2008). The 
next section will assess new literature that relates to the third finding 
while the post-AR4 literature on the first two findings is presented in 
the sector chapters and summarized in Section 6.6.
16 Co-benefits and adverse side-effects describe co-effects without yet evaluating 
the net effect on overall social welfare. Please refer to Sections 3.6.3 and 4.8.2 as 
well as to the glossary in Annex I.
5�7�1 Co-benefits
A substantial share of estimated co-benefits is related to improving 
health through limiting air pollution while reducing GHG emissions. 
Estimates in the literature for the monetized air quality co-benefits 
from climate change mitigation range from 2 to 930 USD2010 / tCO2, and 
co-benefits in developing countries around twice those in industrialized 
countries (see Nemet et al., 2010a) for a review and (West et al., 2013) 
for the high estimate. The gap between developing and industrialized 
countries results from lower levels of air pollution control and higher 
pollution levels in the former countries, and thus the greater potential 
for improving health, particularly in the transport and household energy 
demand sectors (Markandya et  al., 2009; Nemet et  al., 2010b; West 
et  al., 2013; Shukla and Dhar, 2011). In industrialized countries, sub-
stantial reductions in air pollutant emissions have already occurred in 
the absence of climate policy and further tightening of air regulations is 
underway (Rao et al., 2013). If climate policy provides only small incre-
mental reductions, then the co-benefit is small (see Section 3.6.3), 
while large emission reductions are expected to yield substantial air 
quality co-benefits and associated cost savings (see Section 6.6.2).
Much of the literature assessed in AR4 did not explicitly analyze poli-
cies targeted at reducing air pollution−thereby neglecting the associ-
ated opportunity costs of mitigation polices (Bollen et al., 2009; Eden-
hofer et al., 2013). But for countries and regions that do not have or do 
not enforce current air quality regulations, it is important to consider 
expected future air pollution policies. Rapidly industrializing develop-
ing countries may follow the pattern of developed countries and adopt 
regulations to improve local air quality (and provide immediate local 
Figure 5�21 | Impacts of and links between selected substances emitted to the atmo-
sphere. Adopted from (UNEP, 2012).
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health and environmental benefits) before focusing on climate policy 
(Nemet et al., 2010b; Klimont et al., 2013). If this is indeed the case, 
the co-benefits of climate policy will be much smaller. Figure 5.22 
shows the declining trend in SO2-emission intensity per CO2 emissions 
(see Section 5.2 for trends in global SO2 emissions). It shows that 
assumptions about the extrapolation of the historic trends into the 
future will be a major determinant of future co-benefits estimates 
(Burtraw and Evans, 2003; Bell et al., 2008), see Section 6.6.2.7 for an 
example from the scenario literature).
Due to a lack of a counterfactual historic baseline for other policies, it 
is not possible to determine a clean ex-post measure for the co-ben-
efits of climate policies such as the Kyoto Protocol. But it is clear that 
drivers for fossil fuel combustion affect both CO2 emissions and SO2 
emissions (see van Vuuren et al., 2006).
5�7�2 Adverse side-effects
There are also adverse side-effects associated with mitigation. A com-
prehensive discussion is given in the following chapters (6 – 12), while 
this section presents some examples in the context of air pollution. 
While many low-carbon energy supply technologies perform better 
than pulverized coal technologies for most air pollutants, some solar 
energy technologies, for example, have comparable or even higher 
life-cycle emissions of SO2 (see Figure 7.8 in Section 7.9.2). Desul-
phurization of existing coal power plants, however, requires additional 
consumption of coal in the thermal power sector implying higher CO2 
emissions for a given electricity output (Pan, 2013). While CO2 capture 
processes reduce SO2 emissions at the same time, some carbon diox-
ide capture and storage (CCS) technologies would imply an increase in 
NOx and / or ammonia (NH3) emissions (Koornneef et al., 2012).
For the displacement of fossil-based transport fuels with biofuels, 
many studies indicate lower carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emis-
sions, but NOx emissions are often higher. Next-generation biofuels are 
expected to improve performance, such as the low particulate matter 
emissions from lignocellulosic ethanol (see Hill et  al., 2009; Sathaye 
et al., 2011; and Sections 8.7 and 11. A.6). In the buildings sector, the 
most important health risks derive from insufficient ventilation prac-
tices in air-tight buildings (Section 9.7).
5�7�3 Complex issues in using co-benefits and 
adverse side-effects to inform policy
Mitigation options that improve productivity of energy, water, or land 
use yield, in general, positive benefits. The impact of other mitigation 
actions depend on a wider socio-economic context within which the 
action is implemented (Sathaye et al., 2007). A complete incorporation 
of co-benefits and adverse side-effects into climate policy is compli-
Box 5�5 | The Chinese experience with co-benefits from a cross-sectoral perspective1
Pan et al. (Pan et al., 2011) estimate the amount of green jobs in 
three sectors (energy, transportation, and forestry) and the result 
suggests a number at least 4.5 million in 2020 in China. The wind 
power industry in China, including power generation and turbine 
manufacturing, has created 40,000 direct jobs annually between 
2006 and 2010 (Pan et al., 2011). Beijing’s ambitious metro-
system plan, which includes 660 km by 2015 and another 340 
km during 2016 – 2020,could bring more than 437,000 jobs each 
year (Pan et al., 2011). China’s forestation activities could create 
as many as 1.1 million direct and indirect jobs annually during 
2011 – 2020 to achieve its 2020 goals (Pan et al., 2011).
In 2007, China called for a more environmentally friendly and 
resource-saving models of production and consumption (Pan, 
2012). Twelve out of 17 mandatory targets in the 12th five-
year (2011 – 2015) plan are related to the protection of natural 
resources and the environment; the rest are related to the 
improvement of social welfare (Pan, 2012). The actions taken 
under the five-year plan include progressive pricing for electric-
ity consumption; implementation of energy consumption quota, 
disaggregated emission targets; emissions-trading schemes; initia-
tives for eco-cities and low-carbon cities; and upgraded building 
codes with improved enforcement (Pan, 2012).
1 See Sections 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.9, and 11.8 for sectoral effects.
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cated, but it is part of a shift of the development paradigm towards 
sustainability (Pan, 2012).
Co-benefits are pervasive and inseparable (Grubb et al., 2013). It is 
not possible to ‘separate’ each benefit with different decisions: both 
technically and politically, most decisions involve multiple dimensions. 
In addition, most suggested policy changes involve large changes 
in the policy environment as opposed to the concept of marginal 
changes (see also Section 3.6.3). Finally, many effects are measured 
in very different metrics or are not quantified at all. As an example, 
whereas local air quality co-benefits are measured in health terms, 
energy security is typically measured with indicators of the sufficiency 
of domestic resources (e. g., dependence on fossil fuel imports) and 
resilience of energy supply (see Sections 6.6 and 7.9 for details). All 
these characteristics make a comprehensive analysis of co-benefits 
and adverse side-effects of a particular policy or measure challenging. 
This is why a synthesis of results from different research communities 
is crucial for robust decision making (see Section 6.6).
Despite the difficulties, side-effects from climate policy are important 
for policy design (see Section 15.2.4). Costs of mitigation policies are 
over- or under-estimated when co-benefits and adverse side-effects are 
not included (see Sections 3.6.3 and 6.3.6). Co-benefits estimates are 
particularly important for policymakers because most of the climate 
benefits are realized decades into the future while most co-benefits, 
such as improvement in air quality, are realized immediately (Barker 
et al., 2008; Nemet et al., 2010b; Shindell et al., 2012; Jack and Kinney, 
2010; Henriksen et al., 2011).
5.8 The system  perspective: 
linking sectors, 
 technologies and 
 consumption patterns
Between 1970 and 2010 global greenhouse gas emissions have 
increased by approximately 80 %. The use of fossil fuels for energy 
purposes has been the major contributor to GHG emissions. Emissions 
growth can be decomposed in population growth and per capita emis-
sions growth. Population growth is a major immediate driver for global 
GHG-emissions trends. Global population grew from 3.7 to 6.9 billion. 
The largest growth rates are found in MAF.
GHG emissions can be attributed to regions according to the territo-
rial location of emissions, or alternatively emissions can be attributed 
to the consumption of goods and services, and located to regions 
where consumption takes place. There is an emerging gap between 
territorial and consumption-based emissions, signalling a trend where 
a considerable share of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion in 
developing countries is released in the production of goods and ser-
vices exported to developed countries. At a regional level, OECD-1990 
is the largest net importer of CO2 embedded in trade, while ASIA is 
the largest net exporter. This emerging gap opens questions about the 
apparent decoupling between economic growth and GHG emissions 
in several Annex I countries; when consumption-related emissions are 
taking into account both GDP and GHG emissions have grown. Yet, a 
robust result is that, between 2000 and 2010, the developing country 
group has overtaken the developed country group in terms of annual 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes, 
from both territorial and consumption perspectives.
When considering per capita emissions, rather than aggregate GHG 
emissions, other trends become visible. Global average per capita GHG 
emissions have shown a rather stable trend over the last 40  years. 
This global average, however, masks differences between regions and 
sectors. A strong correlation appears between per capita income and 
per capita GHG emissions both from a cross-country comparison on 
income and emission levels, and when considering income and emis-
sions growth. The relation is most clearly for the sectors’ energy, 
industry, and transport (Section 5.3.5), and holds despite the reduc-
tion in the average emission intensity of production, from 1.5 to 
0.73 kgCO2eq / Int$2005 over the same 40-year period.
ASIA had low per capita emission levels in 1970, but these increased 
steadily, by more than 150 %. The EIT region showed a rapid increase in 
per capita emissions between 1970 and 1990, and a sharp drop imme-
diately after 1990. In 2010, per capita emissions are comparable in 
ASIA, LAM, and MAF (5.2, 6.4, and 5.4 tCO2eq / yr, respectively) but per 
capita GHG emissions in OECD-1990 and EIT are still higher by a factor 
of 2 to 3 (14.1 and 11.9 tCO2eq / yr, respectively). Also, between 1970 
and 2010, per capita land-use related emissions decreased, but fossil 
fuel-related emissions increased. Regions vary greatly with respect to 
the income trends. The OECD-1990 and LAM countries showed a stable 
growth in per capita income, which was in the same order of magni-
tude as the GHG-intensity improvements, so that per capita emissions 
remained almost constant and total emissions increased by the rate of 
population growth. The EIT showed a decrease in income around 1990, 
which together with decreasing emissions per output and a very low 
population growth led to a robust decrease in overall emissions. The 
MAF sector also shows a decrease in GDP per capita but a high popu-
lation growth led to a robust increase in overall emissions. Emerging 
economies in Asia showed very high economic growth rates; rapidly 
expanding industries resulted in sharply increasing emissions. In 2010, 
ASIA emitted more than half of worldwide industry-related emissions. 
ASIA showed both the highest economy-wide efficiency improvements 
measured as output per emissions, and the largest growth in per capita 
emissions.
The underlying drivers for economic growth are diverse and vary 
among regions and countries. Technological change and human capital 
are key underlying drivers, but some authors also underscore the avail-
ability of energy resources to play a central role in economic growth. 
Economic growth is strongly correlated to growth in energy use, and 
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the direction of causality is not clearly established. At the global level, 
per capita primary energy consumption rose by 29 % from 1970 to 
2010, but due to population growth total energy use has increased 
much more−140 % over the same period.
Energy-related GHG emissions can be further decomposed in two addi-
tional immediate drivers: energy intensity and carbon intensity. Energy 
intensity has declined globally in all developed and major develop-
ing countries including India and China. This decline can be explained 
through technological changes, the effects of structural changes, and 
the substitution of other inputs such as capital and labour used. These 
historical improvements in energy intensities, however, have not been 
enough to compensate the effect of GDP growth, thus, increasing 
energy consumption over time as a result.
In addition, energy resources have historically become less carbon-
intensive, though increased use of coal, relative to other resources, 
since 2000 has changed the trends exacerbating the burden of energy-
related GHG emissions. Estimates of the resources of coal and conven-
tional plus unconventional gas and oil are very large; indicating that 
resource scarcity has not been and will not be an underlying driver for 
decarbonization.
The immediate drivers that directly affect GHG emissions, namely 
population, GDP per capita, energy intensity and carbon intensity, are 
affected, in turn, by underlying drivers as described in Figure 5.1. These 
underlying drivers include resource availability, development status 
and goals, level of industrialization and infrastructure, international 
trade, urbanization, technological changes, and behavioural choices. 
Among these, infrastructure, technological changes and behavioural 
choices appear to be critical but, even though their influences on other 
drivers is well established, the magnitude of this impact remains dif-
ficult to quantify. 
Co-benefits have large potential to contribute to emission reductions, 
but its historic contribution is not established. Infrastructural choices 
have long-lasting effects directing the development path to higher 
or lower energy and carbon intensities. Infrastructure also guides the 
choices in technological innovation. Technological change affects both 
income and emission intensity of income; it can lead to both increasing 
and decreasing GHG emissions. Historically, innovation increased income 
but also resource use, as past technological change has favoured labour 
productivity increase over resource efficiency. There is clear empirical 
evidence that prices and regulation affect the direction of innovations. 
Innovations that increase energy efficiency of appliances often also lead 
to increased use of these appliances, diminishing the potential gains 
from increased efficiency, a process called ‘rebound effect’. 
Behaviour and life-styles are important underlying drivers affecting the 
emission intensity of expenditures through consumption choices and 
patterns for transportation modes, housing, and food. Behaviour and 
lifestyles are very diverse, rooted in individuals' psychological traits, 
cultural, and social context, and values that influence priorities and 
actions concerning climate change mitigation. Environmental values 
are found to be important for the support of climate change policies 
and measures. Chapter 4 discusses formal and civil institutions and 
governance in the context of incentivizing behavioural change. There 
are many empirical studies based on experiments showing behavioural 
interventions to be effective as an instrument in emission reductions, 
but not much is known about the feasibility of scaling up experiments 
to the macro economy level.
As described across the different sections of the chapter, factors and 
drivers are interconnected and influence each other and, many times, 
the effects of an individual driver on past GHG emissions are difficult 
to quantify. Yet historic trends reveal some clear correlations. Histori-
cally, population growth and per capita income growth have been 
associated with increasing energy use and emissions. Technological 
change is capable to substantially reduce emissions, but historically, 
labour productivity has increased more compared to resource produc-
tivity leading to increased emissions. Regulations and prices are estab-
lished as directing technological change towards lower emission inten-
sities. Behavioural change is also established as a potentially powerful 
underlying driver, but not tested at the macro level. Policies and mea-
sures can be designed and implemented to affect drivers but at the 
same time these drivers influence the type of policies and measures 
finally adopted. Historic policies and measures have proved insufficient 
to curb the upward GHG emissions trends in most countries. Future 
policies need to provide more support for emission reductions com-
pared to policies over the period 1970 – 2010, if the aim is to change 
the future GHG emissions trends.
5.9 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
•	 There is a need for a more timely and transparent update 
of emission estimates� The collection and processing of statistics 
of territorial emissions for almost all countries since 1970, as used 
in Section 5.2, is far from straightforward. There are multiple data 
sources, which rarely have well-characterized uncertainties. Uncer-
tainty is particularly large for sources without a simple relationship 
to activity factors, such as emissions from LUC, fugitive emissions, 
and gas flaring. Formally estimating uncertainty for LUC emissions 
is difficult because a number of relevant processes are not well-
enough characterized to be included in estimates. Additionally, the 
dependence of the attribution of emissions to sectors and regions 
on the relative weight given to various GHGs is often not specified.
•	 The calculation of consumption-based emissions (in addition 
to territorial emissions) is dependent on strong assumptions� 
The calculations require an additional layer of processing on top of 
the territorial emissions, increasing uncertainties without a clear 
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characterization of the uncertainties. The outcomes presented in 
Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.3.2 are only available for years since 1990. 
•	 Empirical studies that connect GHG emissions to specific 
policies and measures or underlying drivers often cannot be 
interpreted in terms of causality, have attribution problems, 
and provide competing assessments� Statistical association 
is not the same as a chain of causality, and there are competing 
explanations for correlations. Studies can attribute changes in 
emissions to changes of activities when all other things are kept 
equal, but historically, all other things rarely are equal. Section 5.3 
identifies population, income, the economic structure, the choice of 
energy sources related to energy resource availability and energy 
price policies as proximate and underlying drivers for greenhouse 
gas emissions. But for most demography variables other than the 
population level, the literature provides competing assessments; 
different studies find different significant associations, and at dif-
ferent levels. Underlying drivers work in concert and cannot be 
assessed independently. From a cause-effect perspective, there 
is, for instance, no conclusive answer whether ageing, urbaniza-
tion, and increasing population density as such lead to increasing 
or decreasing emissions; this depends on other underlying drivers 
as well. The results from the literature are often limited to a spe-
cific context and method. Our understanding could benefit from a 
rigorous methodological comparison of different findings (Sections 
5.3.2, 5.6, 5.7).
•	 It is debated whether greenhouse gas emissions have an 
‘autonomous’ tendency to stabilize at higher income lev-
els (Section 5.3.3.1). It is agreed that economic growth increases 
emissions at low- and middle-income levels. With respect to 
energy, there are competing views whether energy availability is 
a driver for economic growth, or inversely that economic growth 
jointly with energy prices drives energy use, or that the causality 
depends on the stage of development (Sections 5.3.3.1 and 5.3.4).
•	 The net effect of trade, behaviour, and technological change 
as a determinant of a global increase or decrease of emis-
sions is not established (Sections 5.4.2, 5.6.1, 5.7). There is 
evidence that the social, cultural, and behavioural context is an 
important underlying driver, and there are case studies that iden-
tify emission reductions for specific policies and technologies. For 
technology, empirical studies that ask whether innovations have 
been emission-saving or emission-increasing are limited in scope 
(Section 5.6.1). There is a rich theory literature on the potential 
of innovations to make production energy — or emission effi-
cient — but evidence on the macro-effects and the rebound effect 
is still context-dependent (Section  5.6.2). How much carbon is 
exactly locked in existing physical infrastructure is uncertain and 
gaps of knowledge exist in how long physical infrastructure like 
housing, plants, and transport infrastructure typically remains in 
place in which geographical context (Section 5.6.3). Finally, most if 
not all of the literature on co-benefits and risk tradeoffs focuses on 
future potential gains. There is a total absence of empirical assess-
ment about the role that co-benefits and adverse sideeffects have 
played, historically, in policy formation and GHG emissions (Sec-
tion 5.7).
5.10 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 5�1 Based on trends in the recent past, are 
GHG emissions expected to continue to 
increase in the future, and if so, at what 
rate and why?
Past trends suggest that GHG emissions are likely to continue to 
increase. The exact rate of increase cannot be known but between 1970 
and 2010, emissions increased 79 %, from 27 Gt of GHG to over 49 Gt 
(Figure 5.2). Business-as-usual would result in that rate continuing. 
The UN DESA World Population Division expects human population to 
increase at approximately the rate of recent decades (Section 5.3.2.1) 
of this report. The global economy is expected to continue to grow 
(Sections 5.3.3 and 5.4.1), as well as energy consumption per person 
(Sections 5.3.4.1 and 5.5.1). The latter two factors already vary greatly 
among countries (Figure 5.16), and national policies can affect future 
trajectories of GHG emissions directly as well as indirectly through 
policies affecting economic growth and (energy) consumption (Section 
5.5). The existing variation and sensitivity to future policy choices make 
it impossible to predict the rate of increase in GHG emissions accu-
rately, but past societal choices indicate that with projected economic 
and population growth, emissions will continue to grow (Section 5.8).
FAQ 5�2 Why is it so hard to attribute causation 
to the factors and underlying drivers 
influencing GHG emissions?
Factors influencing GHG emissions interact with each other directly 
and indirectly, and each factor has several aspects. Most things people 
produce, consume, or do for recreation result in GHG emissions (Sec-
tions 5.3 and 5.5). For example, the food chain involves land use, infra-
structure, transportation, and energy production systems (Section 5.3). 
At each stage, emissions can be influenced by available agricultural 
and fishing technologies (Section 5.6), by intermediaries along the 
supply chain (Section 5.4), by consumers and by technology choices 
(Section 5.5). Technology and choice are not independent: available 
technologies affect prices, prices affect consumer preferences, and con-
sumer preferences can influence the development and distribution of 
technologies (Sections 5.5). Policies, culture, traditions, and economic 
factors intervene at every stage. The interaction of these factors makes 
it difficult to isolate their individual contributions to carbon emissions 
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growth or mitigation (Section 5.8). This interaction is both a cause for 
optimism, because it means there are many pathways to lower emis-
sions, and a challenge because there will be many potential points of 
failure in even well-designed plans for mitigation.
FAQ 5�3 What options, policies, and measures 
change the trajectory of GHG emissions?
The basic options are to have individuals consume less, consume things 
that require less energy, use energy sources that have lower-carbon 
content, or have fewer people. Although inhabitants of the most devel-
oped countries have the option to consume less, most of the human 
population is located in less-developed countries and economies in 
transition where population growth is also higher (Section 5.3.2). In 
these countries, achieving a ‘middle-class lifestyle’ will involve con-
suming more rather than less (Section 5.3.3.2). Accepting that popula-
tion will continue to grow, choices will involve changes in technology 
and human behaviour, so that the production and use of products and 
services is associated with lower rates of GHG emissions (technology 
Section 5.6), and consumers choose products, services, and activities 
with lower-unit GHG emissions (behaviour Section 5.5).
FAQ 5�4 What considerations constrain the range 
of choices available to society and their 
willingness or ability to make choices 
that would contribute to lower GHG 
emissions?
Choices are constrained by what is available, what is affordable, and 
what is preferred (Section 5.3.3). For a given product or service, less 
carbon-intensive means of provision need to be available, priced 
accessibly, and appeal to consumers (Section 5.3.4.2). Availability is 
constrained by infrastructure and technology, with a need for options 
that are energy-efficient and less-dependent on fossil fuels (Section 
5.3.5). The choice of what to consume given the availability of acces-
sible and affordable options is constrained by preferences due to cul-
ture, awareness, and understanding of the consequences in terms of 
emissions reduction (Sections 5.5.1, 5.5.2). All of these constraints can 
be eased by the development of alternative energy generation tech-
nologies and distribution systems (Section 5.6), and societies that are 
well-informed about the consequences of their choices and motivated 
to choose products, services, and activities that will reduce GHG emis-
sions (Sections 5.5.3, 5.7).
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